Western New England Law Review
Volume 17 17 (1995)
Issue 2

Article 1

1-1-1995

DETERMINING DETRIMENT TO THE
CHILD IN THIRD-PARTY CUSTODY CASES
IN CONNECTICUT
Carolyn W. Kaas

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
Recommended Citation
Carolyn W. Kaas, DETERMINING DETRIMENT TO THE CHILD IN THIRD-PARTY CUSTODY CASES IN CONNECTICUT, 17
W. New Eng. L. Rev. 205 (1995), http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol17/iss2/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.

Volume 17
Issue 2

1995

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND
LAW REVIEW

DETERMINING DETRIMENT TO THE CHILD
IN THIRD-PARTY CUSTODY CASES IN
CONNECTICUT
CAROLYN WILKES KAAS*
INTRODUCTION

Third-party custody cases are disputes over the custody of a
child between the biological or legally-adoptive parent and any
third party.1 They force courts to face issues different from and
more complex than those applicable in a traditional custody dispute
between two biological parents whose status as "parent" is equal.2
* Associate Professor of Law, Quinnipiac College School of Law. B.A., 1976,
Cornell University; J.D., 1983, University of Connecticut School of Law. With thanks
to my colleagues who found a way to give me oases of time away from the clinic for
writing, to the many clinic students who worked with me on our third-party custody
cases, and to the clinic staff who somehow kept track of the many drafts of this article.
Special thanks to Cheryl and Kim, whose stories taught me about the heartache of
third-party custody cases.
1. In this article, the term "parent" refers only to biological parents and those
who have adopted a child through appropriate legal channels, as long as the adoption is
final. "Parent" does not include "psychological parents" or any other care-givers. The
term "non-parent" includes grandparents, other members of the child's extended fam
ily, and all "biological strangers," regardless of their level of emotional attachment to
the child. Legally, their status as non-parent is the same. Hao Thi Popp v. Lucas, 438
A.2d 755,758 n.3 (Conn. 1980). See also Lucy S. McGough & Lawrence M. Shindell,
Coming of Age: The Best Interests of the Child Standard in Parent-Third Party Custody
Disputes, 27 EMORY L.J. 209, 212 n.19 (1978).
2. Connecticut, like most other states, has adopted the "best interests of the
child" standard for deciding which parent shall retain custody after dissolution of mar
riage, CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-56 (1995), or in any other custody dispute between par
ents, regardless of whether they are married, living separately, or whether an action for
205
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Rather, these cases require courts to protect the interest of the fam
ily - parent and child - in remaining together, balancing that in
terest against the needs of the child to be safe and well cared-for.3
In this way, these custody cases have much more in common with
guardianship cases in probate court4 and ab~se or neglect proceed
ings in the Juvenile Matters Division of superior courtS than they do
with parent-versus-parent disputes in superior court.
In some jurisdictions, the courts6 apply the same standard to
third-party custody disputes as they would to parent-versus-parent
custody disputes'? Other jurisdictions apply different standards. 8
Connecticut, like a majority of these other jurisdictions,9 treats
third-party custody cases differently from disputes between two
parents. In 1985, the Connecticut legislature adopted a parental
preference statute10 that presumes it is in the best interests of the
dissolution or separation is pending, § 46b-61 (1995). The Connecticut custody and
guardian statutes are gender-neutral. Since 1901, Connecticut has recognized that the
rights of both parents to custody are equal. See Dunham v. Dunham, 117 A. 504,505
(Conn. 1922) and § 45a-606 (1995), stating that both parents are joint guardians of their
child. This statute has existed in some form since 1902.
3. In re Juvenile Appeal (83-CD), 455 A.2d 1313, 1322 (Conn. 1983).
4. §§ 45a-603 to 45a-622 (1995). See infra part II.B.
5. §§ 17a-90 to 45a-622, 46b-120-46b-151g (1995). See infra part 1I.A.2.
6. In some jurisdictions, the third-party custody standard is judicially created; in
others, the legislature has mandated the test for the courts to apply.
7. Hawaii, for example, has adopted a best interests test by statute and even gives
a presumption of sorts to a non-parent with whom the child has been living:
Custody may be awarded to persons other than the father or mother whenever
the award serves the best interests of the child. Any person who has had de
facto custody of the child in a stable and wholesome home and is a fit and
proper person shall be entitled prima facie to an award of custody.
HAw. REv. STAT. § 571-46(2) (Michie 1994).
8. There are two types of approaches that differ from a best interests test. One is
a "parental rights" standard, requiring that the parent be awarded custody unless the
non-parent can show that the parent is unfit. See Sheppard v. Sheppard, 630 P.2d 1121
(Kan. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 919 (1982); Michael B. Thompson, Child Custody
Disputes Between Parents and Non-parents: A Plea for the Abrogation of the Parental
Rights Doctrine in South Dakota, 34 So. OAK. L. REv. 534 (1989). The second ap
proach is a moderate one, falling in between the best interests and the parental rights
tests. The second test creates a presumption in favor of the parent.
9. Several authors have attempted to assign a standard to each state and have
reached different conclusions. Compare McGough & Shindell, supra note 1, at 214-15
n.24 with Suzette M. Haynie, Note, Biological Parents v. Third Parties: Whose Right to
Child Custody Is Constitutionally Protected?, 20 GA. L. REv. 705, 711 (1986). Some
authors have simply made mistakes. Haynie counts Connecticut as a best interests state
based on the case of McGaffin v. Roberts, 479 A.2d 176 (Conn. 1984), cert. denied, 470
U.S. 1050 (1985). Haynie at 721-26. The author overlooked that, in 1985, the legisla
ture enacted § 46b-56b to overrule McGaffin. See infra part III.B. Even without Con
necticut, Haynie counted 29 jurisdictions with presumption standards. Id. at 711 n.22.
10. § 46b-56b.
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child to be with her parent. l l Under the statute, proof by a prepon
derance of the evidence that awarding custody to the parent would
be "detrimental to the child" can rebut the presumption. 12
Third-party custody cases are decided within two contexts: re
moval and reunification cases. What distinguishes the two is
whether the parent-child custodial relationship is intact when the
litigation ensues. If the child is living with her 13 parent when the
non-parent makes a claim for custody, the court must decide
whether to remove the child from her home. 14 If the child has al
ready been in the care of someone other than her parent for a pe
riod of time when the parent seeks custody, the court must decide
whether to reunite the child with her parent,15 at the expense of the
existing bond between the child and her third-party caretaker. 16
11. See infra part IIlB for a detailed discussion of the passage of § 46b-56b.
12. Depending on the procedural posture of the case, the burden of persuasion
may be on the parent to disprove detriment or on the non-parent to prove detriment.
In Perez v. Perez, 561 A.2d 907 (Conn. 1989), the mother had filed a motion for modifi
cation to regain custody of her children from the paternal grandparents. The court held
she had the burden of persuasion, just as any movant for modification would have. Id.
at 915. See infra notes 125-132 and accompanying text.
13. For ease of reference, I will refer in any hypothetical examples to the child as
female and the parent as male. By no means do I suggest that the standards would vary
in any way based on the gender of either the child or the parent.
14. For example, a grandparent, concerned that neither of his granddaughter's
parents are capable of caring for her, might intervene in the parents' divorce and re
quest the court to award custody to him.
15. For example, a child who has lived with her mother and stepfather for a
number of years may become the subject of a custody dispute if the mother dies and the
biological father seeks to take custody of the child from the stepfather. Or perhaps a
parent has voluntarily entrusted her children to a distant family member or friend while
she is ill or in a substance abuse treatment program, and the caretaker later refuses to
return the children.
16. There will always be cases that do not fall neatly into either of these catego
ries. Consider, for example, a parent and child who live together with a non-parent and
create a family unit. (The non-parent may be of the same or opposite sex as the parent,
and it is irrelevant whether the two adults were married to each other.) If the parent
and non-parent separate, the child will face removal from one or the other adults, both
of whom have enjoyed a caretaking role in the child's life, and both of whom the child
loves regardless of the biological factor. Consider also the facts of the case of Haftel v.
Haftel, FA 91-0060834, 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 1892 (July 27, 1994). The child
had lived since birth with his biological father and the father's Wife, whom the child
believes is his biological mother. The child is the off-spring of a woman who was artifi
cially inseminated with the father's sperm because of the wife's fertility problem. Now
that the husband and wife are divorcing, the father is claiming a superior right to cus
tody solely because of his genetic link to the child.
One choice is to force cases such as these into either the removal or reunification
category, based on whether the main focus is the child's separation from the parent or
from the non-parent. A more logical approach is to treat these types of cases as identi
cal to custody cases between two biological parents and apply a best interests test. The
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Removal and reunification cases present courts with very dif
ferent equitable considerations. Curiously, however, the Connecti
cut courts and the legislature have not distinguished between
removal and reunification cases, nor have they analyzed which facts
are relevant in light of the differences. They also have not ex
amined in any depth the similarities between third-party custody·
cases and the other statutory schemes already in place for separat
ing children from their parents: the guardianship and juvenile mat
ters proceedings. These failures by both the courts and the
legislature have created confusion in the courts about the effect of
the presumption, the definition of detriment, and what type of evi
dence is relevant to the court's inquiry.
This Article examines the Con,necticut legislature's intent in
adopting the presumption standard and explores the similarities be
tween these custody cases and the other types of child removal
cases. It also describes the jurisdictional and procedural considera
tions that determine in what posture third-party custody cases ar
rive in superior court. This Article recommends a method for
applying the parental presumption in Connecticut by proposing va
rying levels of proof and separate definitions of detriment that re
spond to the fundamentally different questions presented by
removal and reunification cases.
I.

OVERVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

The United States Supreme Court has held, in several cases,
that biological parents have a fundamental liberty right to protect
their relationship with their childrenP The Fourteenth Amend
ment of the United States Constitution guarantees that the state
cannot intervene in family matters absent a compelling need. Is At
the root of the constitutional protection of parents' rights are two
biological parent has participated in the creation of a family unit and encouraged the
strong attachment between the child and the other adult. Having done so, he should be
estopped from claiming any other basis for deciding custody.
17. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
18. The state's authority to intervene in a family actually comes from two distinct
sources. The first is the state's inherent police power to prevent citizens from harming
one another and to promote community and public welfare. The second is the paternal
istic power to protect incompetents, to insure the individual incompetent's best interest
and safety. For a thorough discussion of the two types of power, their origins, and their
application, see Note, Developments in the Law: The Constitution and the Family, 93
HARv. L. REv. 1156, 1198-1235 (1980) [hereinafter Developments].
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types of interests: the broad interest of each family member in insu
lating the family from outside intervention19 and the interest of "the
parent in protecting his or her relationship with and authority over
the child. "20 The state also has its own interest in protecting family
autonomy. Its interest normally converges with that of the family
itself, because autonomy enhances warm, enduring, and important
familial bonds21 and ensures that child-rearing is performed.22
A parent's interest in having an on-going relationship with his
children "undeniably warrants deference and, absent powerful
countervailing interest, protection. "23 The message from a series of
Supreme Court cases is that the Constitution will protect biological
parent-child relationships for those parents who have developed an
actual relationship with their children and have shouldered their
parental responsibilities. 24 The Constitution also protects the pa
rental rights of parents who are having trouble living up to their
responsibilities, requiring states to prove unfitness by clear and con
vincing evidence before it can terminate a parent's rights. 25 The
Court has observed that the "fundamental liberty interest of natural
parents in the care, custody and management of their child does not
19. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166, (stating that there is a "private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter"); Developments, supra note 18, at 1313. The child also
has an interest in protecting her family from attack, so long as the family is capable of
caring for her.
20. Developments, supra note 18, at 1313 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972». Despite the plea from social scientists that courts should act solely in the
child's interests, see JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CmLo, (1973). There are remarkably few cases recognizing broad, individual rights of
children, independent of those that they have as members of a family. See Hon.
Charles D. Gill, Essay on the Status of the American Child, 2000 A.D.: Chattel or Consti
tutionally Protected Child-Citizen?, 17 OHIO No. U. L. REv. 543 (1991).
21. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972); Developments, supra note 18, at
1313-14.
22. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166 (holding the parents' "primary function and freedom
include preparation [of the child] for obligations the state can neither supply or hin
der.") (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925». However, there are
times when the state must initiate intervention in a dysfunctional family, such as in the
case of child abuse or neglect, or when the state is invited to step in because the family
unit is openly fractured by divorce.
23. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651.
24. There are three "unwed father" cases that limit the Stanley language, all of
which involved termination of the father's parental rights so that the mother's new hus
band could adopt the children. Whether or not the Court held that the Constitution
protected the father's relationship with his children turned on the quality of the parent
child relationship and level of responsibility that the father had demonstrated. Lehr v.
Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
25. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
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evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or
have lost temporary custody of their child to the State."26 In con
trast, the Constitution does not protect a relationship between a
child and a non-parent even if that relationship "stems from the
emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily associ
ation. "27 Thus, parental status and biological ties continue to playa
major role in the constitutional protection analysis of the rights of
parents and non-parents.
A presumption standard, like the one enacted by the Connecti
cut legislature, is undoubtedly a constitutionally valid approach for
a state to choose in resolving third-party custody disputes. It is con
sistent with the emerging message from the Supreme Court that bi
ology is an important, but not the exclusive, mark of parenthood.
The Connecticut test allows a court to recognize the biological ties
without being blind to other factors displayed by the parent, such as
the level of par~ntal responsibility and commitment to the child.
Analysis of whether a legal standard is constitutional does not
end, however, with an examination of the standard's language. It is
for the trial courts to apply the standard to the facts of each case
and to decide when the presumption is overcome. To do so, the
Connecticut courts must define the phrase "detrimental to the
child" in a manner consistent with the complex guidelines estab
lished by the Supreme Court.
The recognition that a third-party custody dispute involves
either a removal or a reunification scenario begins to put some
structure in the determination of what detriment means. A re
moval case necessarily involves an intact family.28 The court must,
therefore, tread lightly when considering removal by setting a very
high hurdle for the non-parent to overcome. In a reunification
case, the court may find the parent's rights are offset by the child's
interest in preserving her ties with her existing psychological family.
Id. at 753.
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816,844-46 (1977) (quoting
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33 (1972». The Court stressed that the foster
family relationship is not protected because the state is the contractual source of the
relationship. Id. at 845. However, biology does not guarantee constitutional protec
tion. In Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), the Court upheld a California
statute prohibiting a biological father from challenging the presumption that a mother's
husband is the father of the mother'S child born during the marriage. The Constitution
does not preclude a state from preferring the family unit that the mother and her hus
band have created, even if the biological link between husband and child is absent.
28. All that is necessary to create an "intact family" is one parent residing with
one child.
26.

27.
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The biological family's right to be together again has not disap
peared, but it may very well have faded in intensity, allowing the
courts to find more easily that the non-parent has rebutted the
presumption.
II.

A.

SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION IN CONNECTICUT

Superior Court

Family Relations Matters

1.

Beginning in colonial days, the Connecticut probate court29
had primary jurisdiction to decide custody and other matters con
cerning the welfare of children. 30 The superior court had only the
power to decide custody between parents, incidental to a divorce
action,31 and to decide actions brought by writ of habeas COrpUS. 32
The Connecticut legislature has consistently expanded the su
perior court's authority to act in child custody matters; all "family
relations matters" are now within the jurisdiction of the superior
court. 33 The superior court has subject matter jurisdiction to make
custody orders in dissolution, annulment, and legal separation
cases.34 It also has jurisdiction over complaints for custody filed by
parents living separately, regardless of their marital status or
whether any other type of action is pending. 35 Habeas corpus cases
continue to be family relations matters within the equitable powers
of the superior court, although there is no longer any need for a
parent to use this type of equitable proceeding against another
29. Probate courts are courts of limited jurisdiction created by statute. CONN.
45a-98 (1995); Prince v. Sheffield, 259 A.2d 621 (Conn. 1969).
30. The Connecticut Supreme Court previously held that even a modification of
custody between former spouses was not within the jurisdiction of the superior court
but rather, was a matter for probate court. Dunham v. Dunham, 117 A. 504 (Conn.
1922), overruled by Freund v. Burns, 40 A.2d 754 (Conn. 1944).
.
GEN. STAT. §

31.

[d.

32. LaBella v. LaBella, 57 A.2d 627, 629 (Conn. 1948).
33. Several types of custody disputes are now defined by statute as family rela
tions matters. See § 46b-1. Family relations matters also include cases brought under
the provisions of §§ 46b-90 to 46b-114, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
("UCCJA"). However, the UCCJA does not grant to the superior court subject matter
jurisdiction over additional types of cases. The underlying case would have to be an
action brought pursuant to §§ 46b-56, 46b-61, or a habeas case. The UCCJA sets forth
criteria and procedures for deciding which state should il.sue initial decrees and modifi
cations of custody. The purpose of the UCCJA, adopted at least in part in all 50 states,
is to avoid jurisdictional competition among the states. §§ 46b-90 to 46b-114.
34. § 46b-56.
35. § 46b-61. Many habeas cases would now fit within this statute. See Pi v.
Delta,
A.2d 709 (Conn. 1978); Doe v. Doe, 307 A.2d 166 (Conn. 1972).

:roo

212

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:205

parent. 36
The habeas corpus action has existed from "time immemo
rial."37 Originally, it was the only procedural route available for a
parent to test another's right of custody in superior court, other
than in a pending divorce or separation action. 38 Only parents have
standing to bring a habeas corpus case. 39 The power of the superior
court to decide custody in the absence of specific statutory author
ity arose from the court's inherent equitable powers.40 Because
children were considered wards of the state, the court could act on
36. A parent seeking custody from the other parent would move in superior court
to modify the previous order or would initiate an action pursuant to § 46b-61. The
Connecticut Appellate Court has taken a broad view of the types of cases over which
the superior court has jurisdiction, refusing to sustain objections that amount to form
over substance. See Franklin v. Dunham, 510 A.2d 1007, 1008 n.1 (Conn. App. Ct.
1986). The Franklin case involved a complaint for custody brought by an unmarried
father against the mother and maternal grandparents. The court stated that the habeas
action would have been the "usual method" of bringing the action but was not the
"exclusive method." Id. Indeed, the case could have been pleaded as an action pursu
ant to § 46b-61 with an intervening non-parent. Id. The court properly recognized that
the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction whether or not the plaintiff had clearly
articulated the basis for that jurisdiction in his complaint. Id.
37. LaBella v. LaBella, 57 A.2d 627,629 (Conn. 1948).
38. Howarth v. Norcott, 208 A.2d 540, 541 (Conn. 1965), overruled by Hao Thi
Popp v. Lucas, 438 A.2d 755 (Conn. 1980).
39. The issue of who has standing is rarely discussed in the old habeas cases,
probably because all were brought by parents who obviously did have standing. More
recent cases support the conclusion that only parents and other persons who legally
have custody of a child can properly bring a habeas petition. In Doe v. Doe, 307 A.2d
166 (Conn. 1972), a man brought a writ against his ex-wife for custody of their son and
her daughter from a prior relationship. The court quashed the writ as to his request for
custody of his step-daughter but allowed his case for custody of his biological son to
proceed. In Pi v. Delta, 400 A.2d 709 (Conn. 1978), the Connecticut Supreme Court
decided for the first time that an illegitimate father had standing to bring a habeas
corpus case for custody of his child. Then, in Nye v. Marcus, 502 A.2d 869 (Conn.
1985), superseded by statute, the court refused to grant standing to foster parents, stat
ing that only parents and legal guardians have standing to bring a writ of habeas corpus.
Id. at 873.
There is now a very limited exception to this standing rule. In 1988, the Corinecti
cut legislature granted foster parents and approved adoptive parents standing to make
application for a writ of habeas corpus under some circumstances, thereby overruling
the Nye holding. § 52-466(f). Otherwise, the courts have continued to limit the stand
ing of others. In Weidenbacher v. Duclos, 640 A.2d 147 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994), the
court refused to grant standing to a man claiming to be the biological father of a child
born during the marriage of the child's mother to another man. The husband's name
was on the child's birth certificate and he was adjudicated to be the child's father at the
time of his divorce from the mother. In June 1994, the Connecticut Supreme Court
accepted certification on the issue of standing but has not yet ruled. Weidenbacher v.
Duclos,644 A.2d 917 (Conn. 1994).
40. Howarth, 208 A.2d at 543.
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behalf of the state as parens patriae ,41 to decide custody for the pro
tection of the child.42
Ihird-party custody disputes are family relations matters
within the jurisdiction of superior court and may be either removal
or reunification cases. They may arrive at superior court by either
of two main paths. The first is the habeas corpus action. 43 If a child
is living with a non-parent,44 a parent has standing to file a habeas
corpus action to seek custody of his child. By definition, this type
of case would be a reunification case. In contrast, a removal case
cannot proceed as a habeas case because the non-parent has no
standing to initiate the action. 45 Connecticut does confer, however,
a broad right of intervention on non-parents. 46 If a custody action
41. Parens patriae means "parent of the country." BLACK'S LAW DICI"IONARY,
1114 (6th ed. 1990). The term was first used by the English Chancery Court, initially
referring to the rights of lords to profit from wards and later evolving into the doctrine
authorizing and obligating the state as "supreme guardian" to intervene in families to
protect infants, lunatics, and idiots. Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins o/the Doctrine of
Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY L.J. 195, 195-200 (1978); McGough & Shindell, supra note 1,
at 209 n.2. See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967); Thompson, supra note 8, at 551
61.
42. Howarth, 208 A.2d at 543.
43. Although the court's authority to grant habeas corpus relief is an inherent
power, Connecticut now has a statute that codifies that authority. CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 52-466 (1995).
44. This may have occurred because of a voluntary placement by the parent seek
ing reunification or by the other parent. If the superior court had previously granted
custody to a non-parent, a parent could also initiate a reunification proceeding by filing
a motion to modify custody.
45. The only non-parents with standing to bring a habeas corpus petition are
those who already have a legal right to the custody of the child, such as a legal guardian
or a foster parent. See supra note 39.
46. Section 46b-57, in effect in substantially the same form since 1973, states:
In any controversy before the superior court as to the custody of minor chil
dren, and on any complaint under this chapter or section 46b-1 or 51-348a, if
there is any minor child of either or both parties, the court if it has jurisdiction
under the provisions of chapter 8150, may allow any interested third party or
parties to intervene upon motion. The court may award full or partial custody,
care, education and visitation rights of such child to any such third party upon
such conditions and limitations as it deems equitable. Before allowing any
intervention, the court may appoint counsel for the child or children pursuant
to the provisions of section 46b-54. In making any order under this section the
court shall be guided by the best interests of the child, giving consideration to
the wishes of the child if he is of sufficient age and capable of forming an
intelligent preference.

Id.
Courts must interpret this latter sentence in light of the presumption standard of
§ 46b-56b. Otherwise, the courts have construed the statute broadly. The Connecticut

Supreme Court has even upheld the right of a court to consider a non-parent as a puta
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between parents happens to be pending in superior couit,47 a non
parent may intervene and initiate a removal case by asking the
court for custody. If there is no custody action already pending in
which to intervene, the non-parent who seeks to wrest a child away
ftom a parent is limited to filing a guardianship case in probate
court or contacting the Department of Children and Families
("DCF").
2. Juvenile Matters
The Juvenile Matters Division of the superior court has the au
thority to hear those cases defined as "juvenile matters."48 Several
types of these cases require a judge to decide whether there is cause
to remove a child from her home and place her with a non-parent
and, thus,.bear resemblance to a third-party custody case.
All juvenile matters are subject to the statutorily expressed
public policy of this state:
To protect children whose health and welfare may be adversely
affected through injury and neglect; to strengthen the family and
to make the home safe for children by enhancing the parental
capacity for good child care; to provide a temporary or perma
nent nurturing and safe environment for children when neces
sary; and for these purposes to require the reporting of suspected
child abuse, investigation of such reports by a social agency, and
provision of services, where needed, to such child and family.49

Any state intervention, whether custody or the ultimate action of
termination, interferes with a compelling interest on the part of the
tive custodian even if she has not formally intervened. Cappetta v. Cappetta, 490 A.2d
996,998 (Conn. 1985).
47. One or the other parent could have initiated the action pursuant to either
CoNN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46b-56 or 46b-61 (1995), depending on whether the parents are
married and, if so, whether they wish to divorce. Presumably, the intervention statute
would apply if yet a second non-parent sought custody and joined an ongoing action
brought pursuant to a habeas petition by a parent against a non-parent.
48. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-121 (1995) states:
Juvenile matters include all proceedings concerning uncared-for, neglected or
dependent children and youth and delinquent children within this state, termi
nation of parental rights of children committed to a state agency, matters con
cerning families with service needs and contested termination of parental
rights transferred from the probate court, but does not include matters of
guardianship and· adoption or matters affecting property rights of any child or
youth over which the probate court has jurisdiction.
Id.
Since the enactment of 1993 Conn. Acts 344 (Reg. Sess.), contested guardianship
cases transferred from probate court are also juvenile matters.
49. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-101(a) (1995).
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parent and the child to stay together. 50 Thus, the statutes must be
narrowly drawn and must reflect the policy that a child should be
kept in her home whenever possible, even if the home is only mar
gina1. 51 Accordingly, the legislature and the courts have prescribed
in detail the procedure by which a juvenile matters case is to be
presented and adjudicated. It is an action initiated by a representa
tive of the DCF.52 In the first 53 "adjudicatory" stage, the court is to
determine whether the child is "uncared for, neglected or depen
dent."54 The state must prove the child's status by a preponderance
of the evidence. 55 If the court finds that the child is either uncared
for, neglected, or dependent, the judge has three "disposition" op
tions: committing the child to the commissioner of DCF for a pe
50. In re Juvenile Appeal (83-CD), 455 A.2d 1313, 1318·(Conn. 1983).
51. Id. at 1320.
52. In contrast, a private party usually initiates a guardianship case. Third-party
custody cases also involve private parties competing for custody. A juvenile matters
case can result from a complaint filed with DCF by a private person, who is immune
from suit. § 17a-103. Additionally referral may made by a professional who is required
to report cases of suspected abuse or neglect. § 17a-101(b).
53. There are emergency provisions that may actually precede the adjudicatory
stage. For example, a physician who suspects that a child has been abused may keep the
child in the hospital without a parent's consent for up to ninety-six hours. § 17a-101(d).
Other provisions allow the court to remove a child and grant temporary custody to the
commissioner of DCF if there is probable cause to believe the child was seriously in
jured or is in immediate danger of suffering serious injury. §§ 46b-129(b)(2), §17a
·I01(e).
54. Section 46b-129(d) establishes as the standard for removal a finding that a
child is "uncared-for, neglected or dependent." ·Section 46b-120 defines these terms as
follows:
[A] child or youth may be found "dependent" whose home is a suitable one
for him, save for the financial inability of his parents, parent, guardian or other
person maintaining such home, to provide the specialized care his condition
requires; ... a child or youth may be found "neglected" who (i) has been
abandoned or (ii) is being denied proper care and attention, physically, educa
tionally, emotionally or morally or (iii) is being permitted to live under condi
tions, circumstances or associations injurious to his well-being or (iv) has been
abused; a child or youth may be found "uncared-for" who is homeless or
whose home cannot provide the specialized care which his physical, emotional
or mental condition requires.
Id.
The term "abused" means that a child or youth:
(a) has had physical injury or injuries inflicted upon him other than by acci
dental means, or (b) has injuries which are at variance with the history given
of them, or (c) is in a condition which is the result of maltreatment such as, but
not limited to, malnutrition, sexual molestation, deprivation of necessities,
emotional maltreatment or cruel punishment.
Id.
55. In re Juvenile Appeal, 471 A.2d 1380, 1385 (Conn. 1984).

216

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:205

riod of up to eighteen months, and placing the child in foster care;56
vesting the child's care and custody to a third person or agency;57 or
permitting the parent to retain custody, with or without protective
supervision. 58 If the child is committed for eighteen months, the
state (through DCF) must provide a whole panoply of services to
the family and offer the parents assistance in rehabilitating them
selves and remaining in contact with the child. 59 During the time
that the child is committed, the parent has the right to move to
revoke the commitment. 6o The parent has the burden to prove the
cause for the commitment no longer exists, and if successful, the
state has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the revocation would be detrimental to the child. 61 At the end
of the eighteen months,62 the state may seek to continue that place
ment, to return the child home, or to move for termination of the
parent's rights. 63 Termination, which severs permanently the legal
56. § 46b-129(d). During the commitment period, the commissioner of DCF is
the child's legal guardian. § 17a-98. Prior to 1979, there was no time limit on the length
of a commitment. The purpose of the time period is to expedite permanency planning
for the child. In re Juvenile Appeal (85-BC), 488 A.2d 790, 798 (Conn. 1985).
57. § 46b-129(d). The courts appear to use this disposition option very rarely.
According to the Supreme Court, such a placement has no eighteen month time limit.
In re Juvenile Appeal, 488 A.2d at 797. At least one court has called this arrangement a
guardianship, In re Jessica S., 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 2177, (August 24, 1994),
making this option virtually indistinguishable from guardianship ordered by a probate
court, or for that matter, a third-party custody case.
58. § 46b-129(d). See In re Juvenile Appeal (85-BC), 488 A.2d 790 (Conn. 1985),
for a discussion of the three options.
59. The state has a duty to provide services to the parents of a child adjudicated
as uncared-for, neglected or dependent, for the purpose of aiding in rehabilitation and
reunification. In re Jessica M., 586 A.2d 597,603 (Conn. 1990).
60. § 46b-129(g).
61. In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 420 A.2d 875, 881 (Conn. 1979). The
Connecticut Supreme Court identified four factors for the courts to consider when de
termining whether revoking a commitment would be detrimental to the child: (1) the
length of the child's stay in foster care; (2) the nature of the child's relationship with the
foster parents; (3) the degree of contact that the parent has maintained with the child;
and (4) the nature of the child's relationship with her parent.Id. at 882-83. Id. See also
In re Juvenile Appeal, 485 A.2d 1355 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985).
62. The statutes do allow the state to bring coterminous petitions for the adjudi
cation of neglect and the termination of parental rights, rather than waiting for eighteen
months.
63. Section 17a-112 mandates the criteria for terminating parental rights. There
are four statutory bases, written in the disjunctive with the result that proof of one is
sufficient. § 17a-112(b). The court must also make a finding that termination is in the
child's best interests and must consider seven statutory factors. § 117a-112(d); In re
Michael M., 614 A.2d 832 (1992); In re Emmanuel M., 648 A.2d 904 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1993).
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ties between parent and child,64 carries with it the requirement that
the state prove its case by clear and convincing evidence. 65
While there are many procedural differences between third
party custody cases and juvenile neglect proceedings, the basic simi
larity remains: the court is faced with deciding whether cause exists
to separate, or continue to separate, a parent and child in their day
to-day existence.
B.

Probate Court

The original broad authority of the probate courts narrowed as
the legislature expanded the reach of the superior court, but pro
bate courts do retain significant subject matter jurisdiction in cer
tain matters involving children. Probate courts have jurisdiction in
guardianship cases,66 adoption, and the termination of the rights of
parents whose children are not committed to a state agency such as
DCF.67
A guardian has the right of care and control of the child. 68
Parents are automatically considered joint guardians of their chil
dren unless one or both are removed from that capacity by a pro
bate judge.69 Any adult relative of the child may petition the
64. Tennination is:
the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its
rights and responsibilities, between the child and his parent or parents so that
the child is free for adoption, except it shall not affect the right of inheritance
of such child or the religious affiliation of such child.
§ 17a-93(e). See also § 45a-707(g).
65. The standard of proof is prescribed by statute, but is also mandated by the
United States Constitution. § 17a-112; Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
66. §§ 45a-603 to 54a-622. Even though the probate court has jurisdiction over
these cases, contested guardianship cases now can be transferred upon motion to the
juvenile matters division of the superior court. 1993 Conn. Acts 93-344 (Reg. Sess.).
67. §§ 45a-706 to 45a-757. Contested tennination of parental rights cases may
also be transferred to the juvenile matters division of superior court. § 45a-715(g). The
defined standards for tennination of parental rights in probate court and superior court
are the same. Compare § 45a-717 with § 17a-112. The Connecticut Supreme Court has
detennined that both sets of statutes must be construed in a similar manner. In re
Jessica M., 586 A.2d 597,602 n.6 (Conn. 1990).
68. Section 45a-604(5) defines "guardianship" of a minor as: "(A) The obligation
of care and control; and (B) the authority to make major decisions affecting the minor's
welfare, including, but not limited to, consent detenninations regarding marriage, en
listment in the anned forces and major medical, psychiatric or surgical treatments." Id.
69. Section 45a-606 state~:
The father and mother of every minor child are joint guardians of the person
of the minor, and the powers, rights and duties of the father and the mother in
regard to the minor shall be equal. If either father or mother dies or is re
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probate court to remove a parent as guardian. 70 The guardianship
statutes 71 set forth in detail the stringent circumstances under which
the court may remove the parent,as guardian,72 and when reinstatemoved as guardian, the other parent of the minor child shall become the sole
guardian of the person of the minor.
Id.

70. § 45a-614. The court on its own motion, or counsel for the child, may also
petition to remove the parent as guardian.
71. There is some confusion about whether § 46b-56b applies to guardianship
cases that are appealed or transferred to superior court from probate court. An ag
grieved party may appeal a probate decision to superior court. § 45a-186. Under § 46b
1, an appeal of a guardianship case is considered a family relations matter and therefore
within superior court jurisdiction. Pursuant to a relatively new law, a party may also
transfer a contested guardianship case to superior court. See 1993 Conn. Acts 344 (Reg.
Sess.), adopted July 2, 1993. The new rules of court assign those cases now to the juve
nile mattersC:livision of superior court. Rule 8, Probate Rules.
It is unlikely that either appeal or transfer of a guardianship case would render
§ 46b-56b suddenly applicable to it. Although appeals are de novo proceedings, the
superior court is to decide the case as if sitting as a probate court, applying its control
ling statutes and having only the powers of a probate court. Appeal of Stevens, 255
A.2d 632 (Conn. 1969). Therefore, a superior court judge would apply the guardian
statutes on an appeal, as would a juvenile matters judge after transfer.
In two recent guardianship appeal cases, however, the superior court judges cited
§ 46b-56b, and in at least one of these cases, the probate judge had apparently also
applied the statute .. In Hawes v. Probate Court, 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 869,
(Apr. 8, 1994), the judge overturned a probate judge's decision denying a father'S appli
cation for reinstatement as guardian. Judge Harrigan cited habeas case law and § 46b
56b as support for his conclusion that the grandmother had not overcome the presump
tion in favor of the father. In Regish v. Gray, 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 1653, (June
29, 1994), the judge affirmed a probate court ruling reinstating a mother as guardian.
The probate court had found, and the superior court agreed, that the mother had over
come the factors that had resulted in her removal as guardian and that the grandparents
had not rebutted the presumption.
72. Section 45a-61O requires clear and convincing evidence of one of the
following:
(1) The parent consents to his or her removal as guardian; or
(2) the minor child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the
parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or re
sponsibility for the minor's welfare; or
(3) the minor child has been denied the care, guidance or control necessary
for his or her physical, educational, moral or emotional well-being, as a result
of acts of parental commission or omission . . . ; or
(4) the minor child has had physical injury or injuries inflicted upon him by a
person responsible for such child's health, welfare or care, or by a person
given access to such child by such responsible person, other than by accidental
means, or has injuries which are at variance with the history given of them or
is in a condition which is the result of maltreatment such as, but not limited to,
malnutrition, sexual molestation; deprivation of necessities, emotional mal
treatment or cruel punishment.
Id.
Section 45a-607 sets. forth a very high standard for temporary custody while the
application for removal is pending, such as a finding of "imminent physical danger." Id.
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ment of the parent's guardianship is appropriate.73 The burden of
proof in a guardianship matter is always On the non-parent,74 and
he must prove his case by clear and convincing evidence.
There are significant similarities between "custody" and
"guardianship." The term "custody" is sometimes used by courts to
mean different things, but it is fair to conclude that custody applies
to less than all the rights and duties of a parent. 75 A guardian has
the broadest range of the rights and duties of caring for a child, but
the right to custody of the child is certainly the principal attribute of
guardianship of the person.76 Although the statute conferring joint
guardianship on both parents is qualified by the power of the supe
rior court to grant custody to one or the other of the parents,?7 the
loss of physical and legal custody in a divorce or other custody ac
tion in superior court technically does not divest the non-custodial
parent of his guardianship rights.
For practical purposes, however, guardianship and custody are
very similar concepts. 78 Both carry with them the privileges and
obligations of decision-making and the daily care of the child; the
custody decision and the guardianship decision both determine the
primary residence of the child. A superior court order granting cus
tody to a third-party in lieu of a parent has, therefore, substantially
the same effect as a probate court order removing a parent as
guardian of his child and appointing a non-parent in his stead.

73. § 45a-611.
74. See § 45a-61O, supra note 72, and In re Guardianship of A & B, 5 Conn. Pro
bate L.J. 15 (1989).
75. Paul Sayre, Awarding Custody of Children, 9 U. CHI. L. REv. 672 (1942). For
example, a noncustodial parent has not lost his right to visit, and he still has the duty to
support the child.
76. Boardman v. Boardman, 62 A.2d 521 (Conn. 1949).
77. Freund v. Bums, 40 A.2d 754 (Conn. 1944).
78. Pursuant to § 45a-608, a person granted temporary custody of a minor while
an application to remove a parent as a guardian is pending has the following rights and
duties: "(1) the obligation of care and control; (2) the authority to make decisions
regarding routine medical treatment or school counseling and emergency medical, psy
chological, psychiatric or surgical treatment." Id.
These rights and duties are very similar to those of § 45a-604(5), except for the
language limiting the decisions making power of temporary custodians to "routine" and'
"emergency" decisions rather than "major" decisions.
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THIRD-PARTY CUSTODY DISPUTES IN CONNECTICUT: PAST
AND PRESENT

A.

Pre-statutory Caselaw
1.

Habeas Corpus Cases

The older Connecticut third-party custody cases were reunifi
cation cases brought by writ of habeas COrpus,79 No reported deci
sions discuss the differences between removal and reunification
cases or recognize that the equities might vary depending on which
kind of case is involved. This is not surprising. Because third-party
removal cases could not reach superior court until the intervention
statute was enacted in 1973, the distinction was unnecessary.80
Prior to 1985, there was no statute defining the standard decid
ing third-party cases; the standard was judicially created. The Con
necticut Supreme Court repeatedly held that in parent-versus-non
parent cases, the court must give "paramount consideration to the
welfare of the child"81 and that "the legal rights of no one, including
a parent, are allowed to militate against this."82 Because these
cases were reunification cases, the courts were perhaps predisposed
to view biology as an impediment to maintaining the existing posi
tive environment for the child. It is not surprising, then, that the
Connecticut Supreme Court chose strong words to direct the trial
courts' focus to the child.
In a more recent habeas case, however, the Connecticut
Supreme Court reemphasized the primacy of parental status. In
Hao Thi Popp v. Lucas ,83 also a reunification case, the court ac
knowledged that a trial court should decide custody according to
79. See, e.g., Baram v. Schwartz, 197 A,2d 334 (Conn. 1964); Claffey v. Claffey, 64
A,2d 540 (Conn. 1949).
80. Even after the intervention statute gave the superior court subject matter ju
risdiction, cases decided in superior court fail to differentiate between removal and
reunification cases .
.81. Dunham v. Dunham, 117 A,2d 504 (Conn. 1922), overruled by Freund v.
Bums, 40 A,2d 754 (Conn. 1944) (purporting to establish the same test for parent ver
sus parent and parent versus stranger cases).
82. Pi v. Delta, 400 A,2d 709, 710 (Conn. 1978); Sullivan v. Bonafonte, 376 A,2d
69,71 (Conn. 1977); Howarth v. Norcott, 208 A,2d 540, 543 (Conn. 1965), overruled by
Hao Thi Popp v. Lucas, 438 A,2d 755 (Conn. 1980).
83. 438 A,2d 755 (Conn. 1980). The facts of this case are compelling. The natural
mother had given up her children in 1975 in the final, chaotic days of the Viet Nam War
to assure their safe transport to the United States. She was able to follow them a short
time later and in 1976 immediately began trying to undo the adoption to which she had
consented in desperation. Of course, the rule the supreme court announced was not
limited to facts as extremely sympathetic as these.
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the child's best interests, but held that the parent should have a
"strong initial advantage, to be lost only where it is shown that the
child's welfare plainly requires custody to be placed in the stran
ger."84 Indeed, the court even called its rule a "presumption" and
specifically overruled several older habeas cases that, in stressing
the interests of the child, failed to give sufficient weight to the par
ent as against the third-party.85
2. The Me Gaffin Decision
The presumption standard announced in Haa Thi Papp was
the state of the law when the case of MeGaffin v. Raberts 86 reached
the Connecticut Supreme Court. A classic reunification case, Me
Gaffin was a habeas corpus action brought by a natural father for
c.ustody of his four year old daughter who lived with her maternal
grandmother after the death of her mother. The trial court had
granted custody to the grandmother in spite of the statute giving
sole guardianship to the surviving parent. 87 In affirming the trial
court's decision, the Connecticut Supreme Court noted that "the
relationship between parent and child is constitutionally pro
tected"88 but went on to adopt an expansive definition of a parent.
The court approached the issue functionally and rejected a status
argument based on genetics. 89 The court dismissed the joint guard
ian statute as nothing more substantive than "an expression of the
natural importance of parenthood," simply one of the many factors
in determining the best interests of the child yo The court con
cluded by expressly adopting a best interests test for parent-versus
non-parent cases.
The "best interests of the child" test focuses solely on the inter
ests of the child and treats the legal status of the putative custodians
as largely irrelevant. A best interests test defines the relative bene
84. Id. at 758 (quoting In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 420 A.2d 875, 881
(Conn. 1979)). Significantly, the court used as its authority a termination of parental
rights case.
85. See Howarth v. Norcott, 208 A.2d 540 (Conn. 1965), overruled by Hao Thi
Popp, 438 A.2d 755 (Conn. 1980); Antedomenico v. Antedomenico, 115 A.2d 659
(Conn. 1955), overruled by Hao Thi Popp, 438 A.2d 755 (Conn. 1980).
86. 479 A.2d 176 (Conn. 1984), cen. denied, 470 U.S. 1050 (1985).
87. Section 45-43 is now codified at § 45a-606, and provides that parents are joint
guardians. If either parent dies or is removed as guardian, the other parent "shall be
come the sole guardian of the person of the minor." Id.
88. McGaffin, 479 A.2d at 180 (citing Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255
(1978)).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 183.
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fits to the child of being with one or the other party.91 It requires
the court to compare the total package of attributes of the two po
tential custodians: their homes, their larger environments, and their
relationships with the child.92 The two adults start on a level play
ing field. Anyone factor, even a small one, can tip the scale in
either direction.
By the time the Connecticut Supreme Court decided MeGa/
fin, the intervention statute had existed for over ten years and, thus,
the superior courts had subject-matter jurisdiction over both
reunification and removal cases. The Connecticut Supreme Court,
however, did not discuss in MeGaffin the possible range of cases to
which this rule would apply, nor did the language of the decision
limit the use of the best interests test to reunification cases. Rather,
the decision allowed judges to decide third-party removal cases us
ing the same criteria as in parent-versus-parent custody disputes.
The supreme court could easily have upheld the trial court on a
much narrower basis, the special facts of the case. The existing
close bond between the child and the grandmother was clearly an
important factor for both the trial judge and the supreme court.
Rather than changing the test for. deciding all third-party custody
cases, the court could have followed existing precedent, used the
Hao Thi Popp presumption test, and found that the particularly
close bond between this child and her grandmother was sufficient to
prove that her welfare "plainly required"93 she remain with the
grandmother. Instead, the court adopted a broad best interests rule
that, even if arguably appropriate in a reunification case,94 would
91. Robert H. Mnookin, Child-CustOdy Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the
Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 226, 257-61 (1975).
92. In Connecticut, § 46b-56 does not enunciate the factors to consider. Some
states do have best interests statutes enumerating specific factors. See, e.g., COL. REv.
STAT. § 14-10-124 (1989) and VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3 (Michie 1990). The UNIFORM
DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE Acr identifies the following factors as relevant to the con
.
sideration of what is in the child's best interests:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or parents,
his siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best
interest;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does not
affect his relationship to the child.
U.M.D.A. § 402, 9A U.L.A. 561 (1991).
93. Hao Thi Popp v. Lucas, 438 A.2d 755, 758 (Conn. 1980).
94. There is authority that limits the use of the best interests test in third-party
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also apply to a removal case. This rule created the possibility that a
parent could lose custody of his child to a non-parent for even insig
nificant reasons, including those that would never constitute a suffi
cient basis for a probate judge to remove a parent as guardian or
justify commitment and placement in a foster home by a juvenile
matters judge.
This lack of uniform standards between the courts created an
opportunity fora non-parent to forum shop. A potential litigant
had the choice of intervening in a pending superior court family
matters action, filing a guardianship case in probate court, or pursu
ing a matter through a report to DCF. Depending on which court
the non-parent chose, the dispute would be decided under different
standards and quite possibly would result in. different custodial
outcomes.
3. The Dissent in Me Gaffin
Justice Parskey dissented in MeGaffin,95 advocating an ap
proach more reminiscent of the Hao Thi Popp case. Arguing that
the majority had not adequately balanced thr: welfare of the child
and the constitutionally-protected interests of the parent, he wrote
that the joint guardianship statute created a true presumption that a
surviving parent is entitled to custody. Thus, the burden should be
on the non-parent to disprove the parent's priority.96 Justice Par
skey concluded that, to meet this "heavy" burden,97 the non-parent
must "prove that it would be detrimental to the best interests of the
child to live with the parent. "98 He further articulated that neither
a better standard of living99 nor proof that the move would be pain
ful loO was sufficiently "detrimental" to rebut the presumption.
custody disputes to cases where the child is not living with the parent. Vnder the
V.M.D.A., a non-parent has no standing to bring a third-party custody case unless the
child is not living with the parent. V.M.D.A. § 401(d}(2}, 9A V.L.A. 550 (1991). If the
non-parent has standing because the child is not with the parent, then the case is de
cided under the same best interests test applied in parent versus parent cases. Com
ment, V.M.D.A. §401 at 550.
95. McGaffin v. Roberts, 479 A.2d 176, 185 (Conn. 1984}, cert. denied, 470 V.S.
1050 (1985).
96. Id. at 186.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. Justice Pars key did express a reservation about a test that would focus
on the effect a move would have on the child. He feared a divorce would effectively
sever the caretaking relationship between the child and her noncustodial parent and
thus make it difficult for him to prevail in a later custody dispute. Courts might con
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Like the majority, Justice Pars key did not expressly differenti
ate between reunification and removal cases, but his examples show
he was contemplating the existence of both types. Furthermore,
although he did not specifically discuss the need for uniform stan
dards in all the courts, he proposed an approach that would require
the superior court to decide a removal case in a manner consistent
with a guardianship removal case and a reunification case with an
approach similar to a guardianship reinstatement case.
B.

The Presumption Statute

Justice Parskey's dissent resonated within the legal community.
In the following year, 1985, the Connecticut legislature considered
legislation to change the standard for parent versus non-parent cus
tody disputes. lOl Members of both the House and Senate acknowl
edged openly that the move behind House Bill 5122 was to
overturn the majority opinion in Me Gaffin and to adopt Justice
Parskey's dissent. 102 The law would also make more consistent the
standards in superior and probate courts. The Judiciary Committee
heard testimony that the proposed standard was "key[ed] to the
guardian statutes."103
The first version of the bill called for a simple statement that
"[p]arents have a joint superior right to custody."l04 The Judiciary
Committee reported favorably on the bill but recommended
amending the language to create a presumption lOS in favor of par
strue any upset in the child as sufficient to overcome a parent's claim for custody. For
this reason, Justice Parskey stated that it is not enough to demonstrate that the non
parent provides a "nurturing environment." Rather, "the non-parent must prove that it
would be detrimental to the child to take her out of that environment and place her
with the parent." Id.
101. H.B. No. 5122, 1985 Sess. (1985).
102. 28 H.R: PROC., Pt. 8, 1985 Sess. 2611. (Apr. 17, 1985) (statement of Rep.
Wollenberg); 28 S. PROC., Pt. 5, 1985 Sess. 1751-52. (Apr. 30, 1985) (statements of Sens.
Streeter and Johnston).
103. Conn. Standing Comm. Hearings, Judiciary, on H.B. 5122, 1985 Sess. 219
(Feb. 20, 1985) (Statement of Raphael Podolsky of Connecticut Legal Services). Courts
usually restrict analYSis of legislative histories to the comments of legislators made dur
ing the debates on the floor of tl;le House of Representatives or the Senate. However,
when committee testimony illustrates the purpose of the legislation, and serves as the
basis for subsequent legislative action, Connecticut courts do consider such testimony.
In re Jessica M., 586 A.2d 597, 603 n.1O (Conn. 1990).
104. H.B. No. 5122; 28 H.R. PROC., Pt. 8, 1985 Sess. 2612 (Apr. 17, 1985).
105. The effect of a presumption is confused by the imprecise treatment of the
term by both courts and legislatures. JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE,
§ 344,586 (4th ed. 1992). According to McCORMICK, the best definition of a presump
tion is a rule that "require[s] the party denying the existence of the presumed fact [to]
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ents and require a showing of detriment by clear and convincing
evidence to overcome the presumption. 106 The House passed this
version of the Bill,107 but it was defeated in the Senate.l 08 The Sen
ate debate included references to the conflict between parents'
rights and children's rights 109 and concern about the need to protect
children.1 10 Although one senator described the legislation as sim
ply trying to "harmoniz[e] ... the best interests of the child stan
dard, with a policy declaration relative to the rights of a parent,"111
the sentiment that the bill might weaken the court's ability to save
endangered children from bad parents seemed to carry the day.
The proponents of the bill did their homework, evidently con
sulting with some of the senators who had opposed the bil1. 112 They
amended the bill to remove the "clear and convincing" standard
and the language concerning detriment. The change was consid
ered a "compromise"113 by senators, resulting in a bill that did "not
give as much to the natural parent by any stretch of the imagination
that the original bill would have."114 The plan worked, however,
and the amended bill passed the Senate. 115
The House also passed the amended bill.116 The original pro
ponents agreed that the bill was weaker than they had planned but
assume the burden of persuasion." Id. § 342, at 578. The presumption is a method for
assigning the burden of persuasion on the basis of an explicit substantive policy consid
eration. Id. § 344, at 586-89.
106. The House of Representatives amended H.B. No. 5122 on April 17, 1985. 28
H.R. PROC., Pt. 8, 1985 Sess. 2615. Substitute House Bill 5122 read:
In any dispute as to the custody of minor children involving a parent and a
non-parent, there shall be a presumption that it is in the best interest of the
child to be in the custody of the parent, unless it is show [sic], by clear and
convincing evidence, that it would be detrimental to the child to permit the
parent to have custody.
Id.
107. 28 H.R. PROC., Pt. 8,1985 Sess. 2618 (Apr. 17,1985). 'The vote was 143 in
favor, 4 opposed.
108. 28 S. PROC., Pt. 5, 1985 Sess. 1763 (Apr. 30,1985). The vote was 15 in favor,
21 opposed.
109. 28 S. PROC., Pt. 5, 1985 Sess. 1751-61 (Apr. 30, 1985) (statements of Sens.
Streeter, Avallone, Zinsser, and Consoli).
110. Id. at 1757 (statement of Sen. Miller).
111. [d. at 1757 (statement of Sen. Johnston).
112. 28 S. PROC., Pt. 5, 1985 Sess. 2231 (May 8,1985) (remarks of Sen. Johnston).
113. [d. at 2242 (comments of Sen. Avallone). Senator Avallone had previously
voted against the bill but was now endorsing it after the amendments.
114. [d.
115. [d. at 2243. The vote was 32 in favor, 3 opposed.
116. 28 H.R. PROC., Pt. 16, 1985 Sess. 5811 (May 14, 1985). The vote was 130 in
favor and 17 opposed. Public Act 85-244 Section 2 read as follows: "In any dispute as to
the custody of minor children involving a parent and a non-parent, there shall be a
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observed that it still overturned Me Gaffin and adopted the Parskey
dissent. 117
Compromise and last~minute language changes may get a bill
passed, but they may also wreak havoc on the ability to decipher a
legislative history and with the ability of practitioners and trial
court judges to apply the law consistently. The 1985 Act gave no
hint of what proof was necessary to rebut the presumption in favor
of parents. The next year, the House added language clarifying that
the presumption was rebuttable and reinserted the requirement
that, to rebut it, the court'must find that "it would be detrimental to
the child to permit the parent to have custody."118 The bill's propo~
nents did not attempt to add a requirement that the showing had to
be proven by "clear and convincing evidence." The bill passed,119
although once again amid debate about the need to protect families
as an intact unit versus the need on occasion to protect children
from these very families. 120 The statutory language has remained
untouched since 1986 and provides:
In any dispute as to the custody of a minor child involving a
parent and a nonparent, there shall be a presumption that it is in
the best interest of the child to be in the custody of the parent,
which presumption may be rebutted by showing that it would be
detrimental to the child to permit the parent to have custody.121

Section

46b~56b

unquestionably overrules the basic approach
of MeGaffin. It represents a substantive statement of policy by the
legislature that third~party custody cases are not simply a compari~
son of all the attributes of the potential custodians. No minor fac
tor is to determine what is in the child's best interests, tipping the
presumption that it is in the best interest of the child to be in the custody of the parent."
1985 Conn. PUb. Acts 244 (Reg. Sess.).
117. 28 H.R. PROC., Pt. 16,1985 Sess. 5800-01, 5805-06 (May 14, 1985) (comments
of Reps. Wollenberg,.Thlisano, and Frankel).
118. Substitute H.B. No. 5607, 1986 Sess. Testimony before the Judiciary Commit
tee revealed that this bill was proposed to fix mistakes made in 1985.
That is the language that was actually in the Bill at one point last year, and got
lopped off in a dispute over whether the standard of proof should be clear and
convincing evidence or a preponderance of the evidence. The legislature ulti
mately opted for preponderance of the evidence, but in doing so, it took off
half the Bill and this part should never have been removed from the Bill.
Hearings on H.B. 5607 Before the Conn Standing Comm., Judiciary, 1986 Sess. 549
(March 3, 1986) (remarks of Raphael Podolsky).
119. 1986 Conn. Acts 224 (Reg; Sess.).
120. 29 S. PRoc., Pt. 8, 1986 Sess., pp. 2538-41 (Apr. 30,1986) (comments of Sens.
Avallone, Johnston, and Streeter).
121. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-56b (1995).

1995]

DETERMINING DETRIMENT TO THE CHILD

227

scale away from the parent. The legislature left no doubt that the
constitutionally protected parent-child relationship is not to be dis
rupted so easily.
What is not immediately clear from the legislative history is the
type and quantity of evidence required to constitute detriment suf
ficient to overcome the presumption. The law, by virtue of its ap
plicability to all third-party custody cases in superior court, sets the
standard in both removal and reunification cases. Any construction
of section 46b-56b must be broad enough to address the menu of
diverse factual patterns that give rise to these cases. The construc
tion must enable the courts to balance the parents' and children's
needs, whether or not the custodial relationship between parent
and child is intact at the time the court is faced with the decision.
It is unfortunate that the legislators did not discuss the ramifi
cations of the fact that they were passing a law applicable to such a
wide array of cases. There was no detailed discussion on the floor
of the House or Senate of the kinds of cases to which this law would
apply and no clear distinction drawn between reunification or re
moval scenarios. Nor did some of the legislators seem to under
stand how this law would fit into the existing framework of child
protection laws,122 Because the debate centered needlessly and su
perfluously on the obvious proposition that "sometimes courts have
to remove children from dangerous homes," the legislators missed
an important opportunity to examine closely the similarity of fact
patterns and policy concerns123 behind guardianship and third-party
custody cases. In doing so, they lost a chance to create a consistent
standard for probate court and the family and juvenile matters divi
sions of superior court.l24
Section 46b-56b goes a long way towards harmonizing the
122. For example, changing the third-party custody standard in superior court did
not affect the authority of juvenile matters judges to intervene in families to protect
children at risk of abuse and neglect. The law also did not alter the ability of probate
court judges to remove parents as guardians when the need arises. Some of the legisla
tors appeared to believe that they were fixing some flaw in the child removal statutory
schemes by removing the "clear and convincing" evidence language in the third-party
custody bill, when all they were really doing is creating inconsistency across the courts.
123. It would be overstating the legislative history to explain the final bill as a
result of an overemphasis on a reunification case scenario, which is, after all, the kind of
case McGaffin was. There is no evidence that the legislators were creating a rule lim
ited to reunification cases.
124. At other times, the legislature has been clear that its intent was to create
consistent standards. Public Act 83-478, for example, was passed "to standardize the
criteria applied for termination of parental rights by the Probate and Superior Courts."
In re Jessica M., 586 A.2d 597,603 n.9 (Conn. 1990).
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third-party custody standard with those of the guardianship and ju
venile matters cases, but it does not quite reach the mark. The polit
ical process of compromise diluted the original version of section
46b-56b by removing the clear and convincing standard of proof
and leaving unanswered the question of which party has the burden
of proof. The persuasiveness of the guardianship and juvenile mat
ters statutes and caselaw is uncertain. Furthermore, as long as the
possibility exists that the courts will interpret section 46b-56b as set
ting a standard different than the other child removal statutes, the
potential for forum-shopping by non-parents remains obvious.
Despite these problems, the passage of the current version of
section 46b-56b was a significant event. Connecticut's creation of a
presumption in favor of parents means it joined the majority of ju
risdictions in rejecting the use of the same standard in parent-ver
sus-parent and parent-versus-non-parent custody cases. By
explicitly overruling McGaffin, the legislature put its stamp of ap
proval on the reasoning and language of Justice Parskey's dissent.
To achieve the legislature's intended result, the courts must con
strue the phrase "detrimental to the child" as more than just any
harm. The presumption is not rebutted unless the harm to the child
is substantial.
C.

Connecticut Decisions Applying Section 46b-56b
1.

Appellate Cases

There are only a few appellate cases involving third-party cus
tody disputes decided since the legislature passed the presumption
law. In 1989, the Connecticut Supreme Court had its first opportu
nity to construe section 46b-56b. 12s In Perez v. Perez 126 a mother
125. Chronologically, the first appellate decision involving a third~party custody
dispute decided after the passage of the statute was Evans v. Santoro, 507 A.2d 1007
(Conn. App. Ct. 1986). This case was initiated by writ of habeas corpus filed by a
mother for custody of her daughter. The child had resided with her paternal grandpar
ents for approximately two years after the death of her father, the custodial parent. The
trial court awarded custody to the mother and the appellate court affirmed. However,
neither court relied on § 46b-56b. The appellate court did note the existence of the new
law in a footnote, but stated that it did not apply, presumably because the trial court
memorandum was issued prior to the effective date of the public act. [d. at 10lD, n.3.
The court held that the trial court had properly weighed the mother's "significant and
constitutionally protected right to the companionship, care, custody and management of
her child," but did not let the right "inhibit its search for the best interest of that child."
Id. The court ruled that the mother had standing but also had the burden of proof
because she sought to change custody. Id. at 1008-10. Without the benefit of the bal
ancing that the legislature had performed and imposed on the triers of fact by way of
enacting § 46b-56b, the court had to reinvent a mechanism for balancing both parental
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sought to regain custody of her son from his paternal grandparents.
In a procedurally complicated reunification case,127 the supreme
court upheld the trial court's decision to return the child to her
mother, but also affirmed the trial court's holding that the mother,
as the moving party, had the burden of proving that it was in the
child's best interests to be in her custody.128 The supreme court, in
its decision, emphasized that section 46b-56b does not "affect[ ] the
trial court's obligation to award custody upon the basis of the
child's best interests"129 and cited the majority decision in MeGa/
fin for support of its conclusion that the best interests standard is
still the "ultimate basis" of the custody decision.13° The court never
acknowledged that the legislature enacted the statute to overrule
the majority opinion in Me Gaffin and adopt the dissent. 131 Instead,
the court described the statute as more of an evidentiary procedural
device than a substantive statement of policy and accepted the trial
court's limited description of the effect of the presumption as an aid
to the parent by providing that" '[i]f the opposing party's evidence
fails to prove the rebutting facts ... [the] presumption must be ac
cepted as true. "'132
The appellate court has also limited the impact of the enact
ment of section 46b-56b. In Busa v. Busa,133 a reunification case
decided in 1991, the appellate court reviewed a trial court decision
granting custody to a grandparent over a parent. The trial court
had ignored section 46b-56b, five years after its enactment, and had
and children's rights and was loath to deviate from the best interests test. The court
hinted in dictum that even if it applied the presumption of § 46b-56b, the allocation of
the burden of proof would have been the same: "The presumption ... does not shift the
burden of proof in a custody dispute between a parent and a non-parent, but makes that
burden easier to sustain because it gives the parent an initial advantage." Id. at 1010
n.3.

126. 561 A.2d 907 (Conn. 1989).
127. Plaintiff mother filed a motion to modify a foreign state child custody de
cree. The dissolution had been granted by the Connecticut Superior Court, but a Pu
erto Rico court had ruled on the custody issue under the UCCJA. The court held that,
as the movant seeking a modification, the plaintiff had the burden of proof just as in any
post-judgment divorce case. Id. at 915.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 916.
130. Id.
131. In a footnote, the court admitted only that "McGaffin was decided before
the enactment of General Statutes § 46b-56b." Id. at 915 n.13. The court never men
tioned the legislative history of the statute.
132. [d. This is an unnecessarily limited and mechanical view of the effect of a
presumption, criticized by STRONG, supra note 105, and others.
133. 589 A.2d 370 (Conn. App. Q. 1991).
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applied a best interests test. The appellate court did find error and
remanded the case but did so in the gentlest of ways. Stating that
the best interests test "remains the ultimate basis of a court's cus
tody decision,"134 the court, citing Perez, simply held that section
46b-56b and Connecticut Practice Book § 4059,135 read together, re
quire a trial court to articulate whether the presumption was prop
erly rebutted. 136 The court remanded the case for an articulation of
this holding, but did not seem to entertain the possibility that apply
ing the proper statutory standard might very well change the result.
These cases reveal a resistance on the parts of the Connecticut
Supreme and Appellate Courts to implement fully the intent of the
legislature. The courts seem reluctant to leave behind the best in
terests test and tend to minimize the law's impact as only a proce
dural or semantic change, not a substantive change. The appeals
courts have yet to define comprehensively what detriment means
and do not acknowledge that the statute forbids a court from en
gaging in a comparison of the characteristics of the two competing
custodians and deciding custody based on what each may have to
offer to a child.
The decisions do not discuss the differences between removal
and reunification cases or the different factual issues that are rele
vant to each of these two kinds of cases. Only Perez contains any
description at all of what detriment means in a reunification case.
In that case, the supreme court held that the child's unavoidable
pain upon separation from the third-party custodian was not suffi
cient to constitute detriment to the child. 137 Faced with a poor rela
tionship between the child and her mother, the court also
determined that, when a parent-child relationship would improve if
nurtured, the opportunity to nurture that relationship must be
134. Id. at 371. Significantly, in a case decided two weeks earlier, Bristol v. Brun
dage, 589 A.2d 1 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991) (citing Perez v. Perez, 561 A.2d 907 (Conn.
1989», the appellate court stated in dicta that the presumption of § 46b-56b was not a
best interests test. That case involved the effect of a parent's testamentary appointment
of a guardian for a minor child. The court, faced with a choice between the guardian
designated by the parent and a third party, drew an analogy to § 46b-56b and chose to
create a judicial presumption in favor of the parent's choice for guardian. The court
found that the third-party had failed to rebut the presumption by showing it would be
detrimental for the child to be with the guardian named in the parent's will. Id. at 2-3.
135. CONNEcrlCUT PRACflCE BOOK § 4059 states in relevant part that "the court
shall include in its decision its conclusion as to each claim of law raised by the parties."
Id.
136. Busa, 589 A.2d at 371.
137. Perez, 561 A.2d at 915-16.
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given. 138
Finally, neither the Connecticut Supreme nor Appellate Court
have used its power of statutory interpretation to address the prob
lematic lack of consistent standards in the various lower courts.
The decisions contain no evaluation of how similar, in terms of pol
icy and in practice, the third-party custody, guardianship, and juve
nile matters cases can be. Thus, the courts offer little guidance on
the applicability of the case precedent from the other statutory
schemes to the third-party custody situation.
2. Trial Courts
Several superior court trial judges have decided cases since
1985 that required them to choose between a natural parent and a
non-parent.1 39 These included both removal and reunification
cases. Once again, no judges drew a distinction between the two
kinds of cases or attempted to define their task in terms of this anal
ysis. The opinions fall all over the spectrum in reasoning and result,
sometimes functioning as nothing more than a best interests test.
None of these opinions contains a clear definition of detriment.
There are significantly more reunification cases than removal
cases among the reported trial court decisions. 140 Busa v. Busa, 141
138. Id. at 916. These comments echo Justice Parskey's dissenting opinion in Mc
Gaffin, where he observed that neither a better standard of living nor proof that a move
would be painful to the child should be sufficiently detrimental to rebut the parental
preference. McGaffin v. Roberts, 479 A.2d 176 (Conn. 1984).
139. There are no statistics available regarding how often in the last decade Con
necticut judges have decided third-party custody cases. A LEXIS search of the statute
number for section 46b-56b yields fourteen cases. One is a miscitation and five are
cases where the judge refers to the statute as an analogy. See supra notes 71 and 134,
and infra note 159. However, this is not the entire universe of § 46b-56b cases. There is
at least one other trial court decision from 1990 not reported on LEXIS and there may
be more. Search of LEXIS State library, Conn. file (Jan. 16,1995). See infra note 209,
for a discussion of one unreported case.
140. This case type distribution, skewed in the direction of reunification cases, is
bound to continue so long as the current habeas corpus standing rules remain. As dis
cussed supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text, a removal case is only possible if there
is a pending custody action between the parents in which the non-parent may intervene.
The guardianship case in probate court will most likely continue to be the predominant
procedural vehicle used by a non-parent challenging the parent's custody. For example,
a LEXIS search locates only two removal cases decided pursuant to § 46b-56b, search
of LEXIS, State library, Conn. file (Jan. 16, 1995), while there are approximately 800
guardianship cases filed each year in Connecticut. Hearings on S.B. 644 Before the
Conn. Standing Comm. on the Judiciary, 1993 Sess. 1896 (March 19, 1993) (remarks of
Probate Judge Robert Killian) (speaking in opposition to the proposed law to allow
litigants to transfer contested guardianship cases to superior court, passed as Public Act
93-344.)

232

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:205

is one such reunification case. In Busa, the children had been in the
custody of their paternal grandparents for approximately five years
when the mother filed a motion to modify custody.142 On remand,
the trial court cited section 46b-56b and concluded that it would be
detrimental to remove them from the care of their grandparents. 143
The court did not address the present capability of the mother to
care for her sons,l44 stressing instead the positive attributes of the
grandparents. The judge's opinion concluded in essence that be
cause the boys were fine where they were, the court should not
move them. He assumed, without detailed analysis, that to move
children, even to a parent they knew well and with whom they had
spent significant time, would be too difficult for them. 145
Sherman v. Sherman l46 involved a custody dispute between a
father and his children's maternal grandparents. At the time the
court ruled, the children were nine and seven years old and had
been living with the grandparents for nine months.147
The judge examined several types of factors in his ruling. He
cited approvingly the Family Relations Officer's conclusion that
141.
1991).
142.

Busa v. Busa, No. FA 82-011277, 1991 Conn. Super. 0. LEXIS 1351 (June 7,

The natural mother and father had originally agreed to the children being in
the custody of the grandparents when the mother apparently chose to move to Massa
chusetts to attend school. The custody agreement was in writing and filed in the court
in the dissolution action file. However, the grandparents did not intervene formally
until the mother challenged their custody in 1989. Id.
143. The opinion contains harsh opinions about the mother, focussing on her past
selfishness and misjudgments. The judge found the mother to be a selfish woman be
cause she had refused to take her children back after the grandfather had been seriously
injured and had required round-the-clock care. The court concluded that, in the past,
she "was interested only in having a good time for herself." Busa, 1991 Conn. Super.
Ct. LEXIS 1351 at *9.
144. The mother was remarried to a nuclear engineer in the Navy.
145. The judge cited and apparently relied on the Family Relations Officer'S opin
ion that "a change could cause unnecessary adjustment problems for these two broth
ers." Busa, 1991 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 1351 at *9. According to the court's opinion,
the mother visited her sons weekly when she lived in Massachusetts and, after moving
to South Carolina, they visited her for the summers in 1986 and 1987 and for one month
in 1988. Id.
146. FA 90-0269208, 1991 Conn. Super. 0. LEXIS 2353 (July 29, 1992). The
mother had custody of the children after the divorce. The father later sought custody.
For some reason not reported in the decision, the mother arranged for the children to
live with her parents. The maternal grandparents then moved to intervene in the pend
ing case, and the dispute crystallized between the father and grandparents.
147. This is a reunification case, even though the children had been living with the
grandparents for only a short time. They had been living apart from their father for
much longer due to their parents' divorce and their custodial relationship with the fa
ther had already been disrupted.
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"the move alone" would be substantially detrimental to the chil
dren. l48 Then the court's focus turned to the father's characteris
tics. The court questioned his parenting skills and found that the
father's rented room was not suitable for children, contrasting it to
the spacious suburban home in a residential neighborhood in which
the grandparents lived. Finally, the court recited the father's past
convictions for child molestation and weapons possession and his
history of violence toward the mother.1 49
The judge stated at the outset of his ruling that he took section
46b-56b into consideration but did not explain further what evi
dence rebutted the presumption. Nor did the judge specifically
state which of these facts constituted detriment. He simply con
cluded by finding that "it is in the best interests of the children" to
be in the custody of the grandparents. Perhaps, after making so
many factual findings negative to the father, he thought it would be
obvious, but the opinion leaves questions about how the judge de
fined the standard and how close the standard is to a best interests
test.
Other cases contain more discussion of how the court applied
section 46b-56b to the facts. In the case of In re Jacqueline D. ,150
the judge had before him consolidated family and neglect cases.
The custody action was between a father and the paternal grand
parents. l5l Although the two actions were distinct procedurally,
the question before the court was the same: was the ten year old
child to remain with her grandparents, as they and the Department
of Children Services ("DCYS") sought, or to be reunited with her
father for the first time in over eight years?152 The court was mind
ful of section 46b-56b and its presumption in favor of the father and
also of the caselaw giving parents a "strong advantage" in cases
brought by DCYS. The judge found that both the grandparents and
148. Sherman, 1991 Conn. Super Q. LEXIS 2353 at *4. One can assume the
judge was referring to the normal process of adjustment.
149. These facts reflect the father's past and are, therefore, not the type of evi
dence that necessarily demonstrates present detriment. The opinion contains no discus
sion of the correlation between the father's past problems and his current ability to care
appropriately for his children.
150. No. N87-128, No. 823411992 Conn. Super. Q. LEXIS 1037 (Apr. 15, 1992).
151. Id. at *1. The court had committed the child in 1988 to the care of the com
missioner of the Department of Children and Youth Services ("DCYS"), which was
renamed in 1993 to DCF. DCYS had placed her in the home of her grandparents where
she had remained for almost five years.
152. Id. at *5. The mother was not seeking custody.
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DCYS had met their burdens, concluding it would be detrimental to
the child to live with her father.
The judge's ruling was a mixture of an analysis of the father's
parental skills and the effect on the child of moving. Using factors
spelled out by the Connecticut Supreme Court for deciding whether
to revoke the commitment of a child to the care of DCYS, the court
looked at: (1) the length of the child's stay with her grandparents;
(2) the nature of her close relationship with her grandparents; (3)
the degree of contact with her father; and (4) the nature of her
strained relationship with the father. 153 The court then recited sev
eral facts relevant to these considerations. The father had been a
primary caretaker of the child for less than a year more than eight
years prior to the proceedings. The child expressed fear of her fa
ther and had a strong preference for staying with her grandparents.
The court further found that the father could not provide a secure,
violence-free home for the child. He had evaded a court-ordered
home study and often had no housing. The father's plan for his
daughter did not provide for continuation of the child's necessary
counseling or her educational and social activities. In short, the
court concluded that to award custody to the father would be detri
mental to the child because it would "deprive her of the only secure
and stable home she has had during the ten-and-a-half years of her
life and plunge her into unchartered (sic) territory."154
Most recently, the judge in Foster v. Devino,155 a removal case,
gave a detailed analysis of his factual basis for awarding custody to
a non-parent. The court applied section 46b-56b. 156 Although the
judge did not spend much time defining his terms, his approach re
vealed that he read its impact to be quite similar to that of a guardi
anship case or juvenile matters proceeding.
In Foster, the children, ages three and four and one half, had
lived with their mother since birth. The mother initiated a custody
action against her children's father to whom she had never been
married. The paternal grandparents intervened and sought cus
153. In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 420 A.2d 875 (Conn. 1979). However,
neither the supreme court that identified the factors nor the trial court that applied
them explained why these are the relevant considerations or defined what weight the
court should give to each of them.
154. In re Jacqueline D., 1992 Conn. Super. a. LEXIS 1037 at *17.
155. FA 94-0110479, 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 1161 (May 5, 1994).
156. Id. at *9-11. This was the proper standard. The grandparents intervened in
a custody action between the unmarried parents filed under § 46b-61.
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tody.157 Factually, the court found that the mother's poor judgment
and insight left her with limited ability to meet the physical and
emotional needs of her two young children. The judge also cata
logued numerous injuries the children had suffered and concluded
that, at a minimum, the mother had done a poor job of supervising
her children. She had refused parenting assistance from the DCF,
had subverted visitation with the father and grandparents, and had
failed to recognize the impact of her actions on her children. The
court concluded that the mother's "traits impact negatively on the
[mother's] desire and ability to instill, in the children, respect for
truth and authority and therefore [the mother's traits] will work to
their detriment."158 Although the court's final summation speaks in
terms of it being in the "best interests" of the children to be with
their grandparents, it is clear that the judge did not decide this case
using a traditional best interests test. Rather, he reached this ulti
mate conclusion because he found that the grandparents had rebut
ted the presumption by proving it would be substantially
detrimental to the children to remain with their mother.
These trial court decisions 159 demonstrate the confusion that
results from the lack of a clear definition of detriment and the fail
ure to distinguish between reunification and removal cases. Some
judges have begun to articulate the factors they found relevant, and
at least one has adopted factors from a juvenile matters case, but
there is yet to be a consensus among the courts. Without a well
157.

Id. at *2. The natural father lived with his parents but was never a candidate

for custody.
158.

Id. at *17-18.

159. There is one other reported trial court third-party custody matter not dis
cussed in this article because it is on appeal and was scheduled to be argued on October
3, 1995. There are four other recent cases, that are not actually custody cases, where
§ 46b-56b is applicable, but the court has referred to the standard in each case, either
mistakenly or by analogy. See note 71, supra, for a discussion of two guardianship cases
where the superior court applied § 46b-56b on appeal. In the case of In re Aracelli G.,
1993 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 3242, (Dec. 9, 1993), the judge used § 46b-56b as analo
gous precedent for deciding a father'S motion for custody, which he had filed in a ne
glect proceeding that the state had initiated against the child's mother. The juvenile
matters judge originally had removed the child from her mother'S care and had placed
her with her maternal grandmother. The court granted the father's motion, concluding
that, consistent with the policy behind § 46b-56b, the child should be with her father
rather than her grandmother, and that in this case it would cause the child no detriment
to order the change in custody. In Garrett v. Appeal from Probate, CV 93-0308807,
1994 Conn. Super. O. LEXIS 2308 (Sept. 8,1994), Judge Levin again referred to § 46b
56b as evidence of the state's policy in favor of parents. Nonetheless, in this particular
appeal from a probate court's decision, he agreed with the probate judge that the re
moval of the father as guardian was appropriate.
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defined policy behind the presumption standard, a recognition that
removal and reunification cases are fundamentally different, or a
coherent framework of criteria, trial judges are left to decide for
themselves what detriment means.
IV. How

MUCH DETRIMENT SHOULD

IT

TAKE?

Black's Law Dictionary defines detriment as "raJny loss or
harm suffered in person or property."160 A "plain language" or lit
eraP61 construction of the statutory provision suggests that a show
ing of any harm to the child that would be occasioned by awarding
custody to the parent would establish "detriment" sufficient to re
but the parental presumption. But can it really be that easy? If
detriment to the child means any harm, no matter how minimal or
short-term, then the rebuttable presumption dissolves into a best
interests test so that the effect of the presumption is illusory.162
To give the term "detriment" meaning in this context, one must
look beyond the pages of the dictionary.163 Indeed, breathing life
into the concept requires analysis of the policies at work in both
removal and reunification cases.
A.

Removal Cases

In a removal case, the court should examine only the parent's
capability to meet the child's basic needs, and the non-parent
160. BLACK'S. LAW DIcnONARY, 451 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added).
161. A definition that reflects the way people use a word in common parlance is a
"lexical" definition. IRVING M. COPI, INTRODUCTION TO LoGIC, 143-44 (7th ed. 1986).
Lexical definitions often have the disadvantage of being ambiguous and uncertain.
162. For example, a court would be free to say it is "harmful" for a child not to
have the best home or school or the most well-educated parent, regardless of whether
the child is really in any danger at home, or whether the parent is incapable of caring
adequately for the child.
Courts and commentators have advised against using a best interests test, espe
cially in parent-grandparent disputes:
When a parent is young, the phySical, financial and even emotional factors
may often appear to favor the grandparents. One cannot expect young par
ents to compete on an equal level with their established older relatives. So the
"best interest" standard cannot be the test. If it were we would be forced to
conclude that only the more affluent in our society should raise children. To
state the proposition is to demonstrate its absurdity.
Barstad v. Frazier, 348 N.W.2d 479, 483 (Wis. 1984); Janet Leach Richards, The Natural
Parent Preference Versus Third Parties: Expanding the Definition of Parent, 16 NOVA L.
REv. 733, 734-35 (1992).
163. This Article suggests that courts should move away from the imprecise lexi
cal definition of detriment and instead adopt a stipulative definition, giving all parties
notice of the governing definition. CoPI, supra note 161, at 144-45.
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should prove the parent's incapability by clear and convincing evi
dence. This approach defers to the interests of family integrity, but
provides a mechanism for assuring children are safe and cared-for.
The standard implements the legislature's intent with even greater
facility than the legislature was able to achieve. This definition of
detriment for removal cases also achieves harmony with the other
child removal statutory provisions that already exist.
1.

Defining Detriment

In a case where a non-parent is seeking to remove custody
from a parent, the judge's challenge is to decide at what point the
. court should, interfere with and disrupt the daily parent-child rela
tionship. Even without regard to the parent's rights or needs, re
moval cases require the court to balance the conflicting needs of the
child: those of safety and basic physical and emotional care with the
child's need for the continuity of the emotional attachment with the
parent. The child has a strong interest in staying with the parent. 164
The presumption that it is in the best interests of the child to be in
the parent's care embodies the recognition that there is an ~mo
tional bond between parent and child and that the child will suffer
psychological harm if she is removed from the parent's care. 165 For
this reason, it is never a benefit to the child to remove her from a
marginal, yet adequate, home simply for the reason that the non
parent offers her a home with more physical comforts or a more
skillful caretaker. Accepted wisdom holds that the pain of the sepa
ration far outweighs the material advantages the non-parent can
provide. 166
164. "So long as a child is a member of a functioning family, his paramount inter
est lies in the preservation of his family." GOLDSTEIN, ET AL. supra note 20, at 5.
165. Psychologists agree that separating a child from her pare,nts creates harm for
the child. Both psychoanalytic theory and developmental studies establish "the need of
every child for unbroken continuity of affection and stimulating relationships with an
adult." GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 20, at 6. Psychoanalytic theory suggests that
once a child bonds with her psychological parent, separation is very damaging. Conse
quently, removal is only appropriate in extreme cases, where it is the "least detrimental
available alternative for safeguarding the child's growth and development." Id. at 53.
Attachment theory similarly stresses the importance of parent-child bonds but suggests
that children can form multiple attachments and that other factors can mitigate the
harm of separation. Everett Waters & Donna M. Noyes, Psychological Parenting vs.
Attachment Theory: The Child's Best Interests and the Risks in Doing the Right Things
for the Wrong Reasons, XII REVIEw OF LAw & SoCIAL CHANGE 505, 512 (1983-84)
(discussing the research and theories of Bowlby and Rutter). Nonetheless, psycholo
gists supporting the attachment theory also advocate that courts and social agencies
should be very cautious about removing children from their parents. Id. at 513.
166. See supra note 163.
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Obviously, however, there are parents who are simply incapa
ble of taking adequate care of their children. In those cases the
child's minimum care needs do outweigh the confusion, upheaval,
and hurt the child will suffer from being removed from the parent.
The court's obligation to decide when to intervene in a family is not
new, nor is it unique to third-party custody cases under section 46b
56b. Probate judges face the identical question when presented
with a petition to remove a parent as a guardian.1 67 Juvenile mat
ters judges do so as well when they rule on a petition to adjudicate a
child as uncared-for, neglected or dependent.168 The Constitution
and state statutes already require these courts to balance the need
to protect children with the obligation to protect family autonomy.
There is no rational basis for creating a test for defeating" a
parent's custody different from those that already exist for guardi
anship cases and juvenile matters cases. The fundamental nature of
the rights of the family at stake are the same. The Connecticut
Supreme Court has already recognized that the public policy in
favor of family integrity is the same in cases transferring guardian
ship to private parties and in those committing the child to the care
of a state agency.169 Third-party custody removal cases raise the
identical concern for family integrity. To the parent and the child, it
matters little whether the case began because an Assistant Attorney
General filed the case in juvenile court, or whether a family mem
ber filed a petition in probate court or intervened in an existing
superior court case. To the parent, all these cases pose the same
question: "Will the judge take my child away?" To the child, these
cases pose an equally basic question: "Where will I live?"
The statutory predicate for removal of guardianship rights and
for adjudication of a child as uncared-for, neglected, or dependent
focuses on the parent: the ability to keep the child safe from physi
cal injury and to provide the child with basic care. Neither standard
allows removal for the simple fact that some other person is better
able to raise the child or provide more for the child. In a contested
guardianship case, Probate Judge Kurmay articulated the standard
by which probate judges are to apply the guardianship statutes:
.[T]he issue involved in this case is not whether the maternal aunt
and uncle are better caretakers of J. than the natural mother. By
167.

CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-61O (1995). See supra note 72 for the provisions of

§ 45a-61O.
§ 46b-129. See supra note 54 for the provisions of § 45a-129.
169. In re Jessica M., 586 A.2d 597, 603 (Conn. 1991).

168.
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the same token, the issue is not whether J. will perform better in
the guardian's home rather than that of the mother. The only
issue has been and remains whether the conduct has been so det
rimental to the needs of the child as to warrant her removal pur
suant to the specific standards in the previously cited Section of
the Connecticut General Statutes. The focus, by legislative deci
sion and by court interpretation, is on the conduct of the parent
and not on the needs of the child. It is assumed by the State
Legislature that a minimally-functioning parent is the appropri
ate caretaker of that parent's child, even over another individual
whose abilities are far superior to those of that parentPO

This approach describes exactly how superior court judges
should decide third-party custody removal cases. In a removal case,
then, the court's inquiry must focus solely on the parent's present
characteristics, but only insofar as those characteristics have an im
pact on the child's well-being. Only when the parent's present ca
pability to provide the child with the basic needs falls below an
adequate level is it detrimental to the child to stay in the parent's
care. l71
In deciding the question of whether to remove the child, the
court should not consider the potential third-party custodian in any
way. The attributes and parenting capabilities of the non-parent
are completely irrelevant to the determination of whether the par
ent can care for his child. It is also inappropriate for the court to
consider the type and nature of the relationship between the child
and the non-parent.
Most removal cases involve claims by non-parents who are
170. In re Guardianship of J., Probate Court, District of Stratford, Sept. 4, 1990,
(Kurmay, P.J.) slip op. at 3-4. As a result of abuse allegations against the mother and
stepfather, Judge Kurmay had removed the mother as the child's guardian in 1987 when
the child was seven years old, appointing the maternal aunt and uncle as guardians in
the mother's stead. After laying down, in prior rulings, strict conditions for visitation
and individual and family counseling, the court eventually reinstated the mother as
guardian three years after her removal. The court found that the mother had "benefit
ted immensely" from counseling and was "far better able to cope with the responsibility
of raising J. than she ever was before." Id. at 4. Applying the standard to these facts,
the court reinstated the mother with orders for the mother to continue in counseling.
171. It is detrimental for a child to remain in the care of a parent who cannot
fulfill the child's basic needs, regardless of why the parent cannot do so. Whether a
parent is incapable because of mental illness, mental disability, lack of awareness, or
substance abuse is irrelevant to the basic question of whether the parent can care for
the child, although it may be very relevant to whether the parent can ever gain or regain
the capacity to care for the child. Similarly, the guardianship statutes also require the
court to measure a parent's ability and to ignore the origin of the parent's problem.
§ 45a-610(3).
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members of the child's extended family and whom the child knows
and often loves. 172 It is tempting, therefore, to decide removal
cases on a "sliding scale" basis: the closer the emotional ties be
tween the child and the non-parent, the less cause the court must
find before it can remove the child. This approach is a dangerous
dilution of the family's need for autonomy. The decision when to
intervene in a family must remain a rigidly separate consideration
from the question of where the child would live if the court re
moved her. 173 Nor does the presence of extended family members
as alternative caretakers make removal a trouble-free solution to a
nuclear family's problems. Placing the child with family members
or friends will not lessen the child's pain of separation from the
parent. It also invites family meddling and intergenerational con
flicts,174 and underestimates the emotional investment the non-par
ent may have in sabotaging the parent-child relationshipPs
Because of the difficulties inherent in later returning children
home, a court should not lightly enter into a removal case, and
thereby invite, for some future time, the more complex conflicts of
a reunification case.
When evaluating the parent's present capabilities to care for
the child, the superior court judge should adopt the same cautious
level of scrutiny that probate and juvenile matters judges bring to
their tasksp6 The court should look freely to the analogous prece
172. The non-parent was a relative in all the reported third-party custody cases in
Connecticut decided since the § 46b-56b was enacted and in most of the older habeas
corpus cases as well.
173. These decisions are distinguishable in other contexts, too. In guardianship
cases, the court is only to examine the existence of a relationship between the child and
prospective guardian when appointing a guardian after removal of the parent. § 45a
617. Similarly, the case of In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 420 A.2d 875 (Conn.
1979), requires a court to examine the grounds for terminating a parent's rights without
considering the attributes of the prospective adoptive parents. See Sharon I. Farquhar
son, Comment, The "Tho-Pronged" Inquiry - The Best Alternative for the Conflicting
Rights Involved in Proceedings for Termination of Parental Rights, 13 CoNN. L. REV.
709 (1981).
174. Richards, supra note 162, at 734.
175. Often intra-familial custody disputes end up being battles over other family
grievances with the child as the battleground. Some of the ugliest stories arise when the
parent is engaged in a custody battle with his or her own parents. See, for example, In
re Jacqueline D., NO. N.87-128, No. 82341, 1992 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 1037 (Apr. 15,
1992). Although DCF can place a committed child with "persons related by blood,"
§ 46b-129(d), there is literature warning child placement workers about the difficult
dynamics involved in such placements. JOSEPH R. CARRIERI, CHILD ABUSE, NEGLEcr,
AND THE FOSTER CARE SYSTEM, Practicing Law Institute (1993).
176. The test for removal in abuse and neglect proceedings has been described as
a determination of "whether the child can be protected from the specific harm(s) justi
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dent of the guardianship and the abuse and neglect statutes and
cases. The court will then have the necessary framework from
which to evaluate the specific facts of the case in order to answer
the only question relevant to a removal case: does this parent pres
ently have the necessary emotional commitment and capability to
fulfill his or her child's minimum needs·? Only if the court finds that
the non-parent has proven that the parent is incapable of providing
this minimum level of care do grounds exist for removal of the child
from the parentP7
One Connecticut judge has already gravitated to this type of
inquiry in removal cases. In Foster v. Devino,178 Judge West em
ployed exactly this examination of the parent's characteristics when
he focussed on the capability of the mother to care for her chil
dren's physical and emotional needs as a basis for determining what
would be detrimental for the children. 179
2. Burden and Level of Proof
In order to be consistent with the guardianship and juvenile
matters cases, the court should always assign the burden of proof to
the non-parent seeking removal.1 80 The quantum of proof by which
fying intervention if left in the home." Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of
"Neglected" Children: Standards for Removal of Children from Their Homes, Monitor
ing the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN.
L. REv. 623, 650-51 (1976). The court should first vigorously examine whether services
short of removal are "adequate to ensure the child will not be injured again." [d.
177. The focus is on the parent's present capability. As is the usual case, past
behavior including past abuse may be relevant but only to the extent it illuminates a
parent's present characteristics. Past conduct is not an automatic indicator of current
conduct.
178. No. 0110479, 1994 Conn. Super: Ct. LEXIS 1161 (May 5, 1994).
179. There is also persuasive authority in other states supporting this approach
with removal cases. In Texas, the presumption is rebutted by showing that granting
custody to the parent "would significantly impair the child's physical health or emo
tional development." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.01(b)(I) (1994). In Lewelling v. Le
welling, 796 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. 1990), the Supreme Court of Texas construed the statute
as one requiring it to decide how dysfunctional the mother must be to be deemed to
cause significant harm to her child. The court concluded that it would not impair the
child to live with a mother who was unemployed, had periods of psychiatric treatment,
and was a victim of spousal abuse. Id. at 167. There are also cases in other states where
the non-parent has prevailed under this type of test. For example, in Hunt v. Whalen,
565 N.E.2d. 1109 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), the Indiana Court of Appeals upheld the finding
that the grandparents had rebutted the parental presumption with clear and convincing
evidence by showing that the mother was unable to provide adequate nutrition for the
child, had failed to follow specific medical advice for treating the child, and had no
source of income, id. at 1111, all of which are, arguably, indicators of the parent's inabil
ity to meet the child's basic needs.
180. The legislature was silent when it enacted § 46b-56b regarding which party
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the non-parent should prove his or her case is less clear. As the
statute currently stands, rebutting the presumption takes proof of
detriment by a preponderance of the evidence. 181 This is the same
standard as in the juvenile matters adjudication phase and in tem
porary custody decisions but is a less demanding standard than the
clear and convincing evidence rule utilized in guardianship cases. It
is, therefore, impossible to recommend a rule that would be com
pletely consistent with both of the other types of cases.
It is better policy, and more logical, to adopt a clear and con
vincing evidence rule for removal cases. 182 In many ways, third
party custody cases are more like guardianship cases than juvenile
matters cases. Both third-party custody and guardianship cases are
initiated by private parties,183 and the time frame of the non-par
ent's custody or guardianship is open-ended. l84 In a juvenile mat
ters case, the court's adjudication of a child as uncared-for,
neglected, or dependent does not necessarily result in her removal
from her parent. 185 The neglect finding often becomes the mere
predicate for the provision of free services, and DCF supervision is
sufficient to keep the child safe and well cared-for. In contrast, the
fundamental issue in both guardianship and third-party custody
cases is the· child's residence. There are no options short of a
change in the child's home. Furthermore, neither the guardianship
bears the burden of persuasion. In Perez v. Perez, 561 A.2d 907 (Conn. 1989), the court
assigned the parent the burden of proof because she had initiated the case through a
modification motion. However, the court should not assign the burden of proof based
on the accident of procedural posture. The burden of proof should always be assigned
to the non-parent as a function of the substantive preference for the parent, in accord
ance with the recommendation of STRONG, supra 105, that a presumption is a rule that
assigns the burden of persuasion. The Connecticut Supreme Court has recognized in
other contexts, where a fundamental constitutional right is involved, that the burden of
proof is always on the party seeking to interfere with that right. In re Jessica M., 586
A.2d 597,605 (Conn. 1990). In order to assign the burden of proof to the non-parent in
every instance, it would take action by the Connecticut Supreme Court to alter that part
of the holding in Perez or a legislative amendment to the statute.
18l. The legislature adopted the usual civil standard of preponderance of the evi
dence when it rejected the use of the clear and convincing standard.
182. Adopting this standard of clear and convincing evidence for removal cases
would require legislative change.
183. In both, neither the court nor the DCF closely supervise the non-parent's
ongoing custody of the child.
.
184. The parent who has lost his child in a guardianship or third-party custody
case must initiate a proceeding to be reunited with his child. Juvenile commitments are
usually limited to eighteen months. § 46b-129(d).
185. In re Juvenile Appeal, 471 A.2d 1380, 1384-85 (Conn. 1984). Indeed, it was
precisely the fact that removal is not the automatic result of an adjudication that per
suaded the court to adopt a preponderance standard in neglect cases. Id.
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decision in probate court nor the third-party custody decision in su
perior court will automatiCally trigger the family's access to the sup
portive services of DCF.186 As a consequence, a judge deciding a
third-party custody case may feel removal is the only available
method to assure the child's safety.
B. Reunification Cases
Reunification cases arise in a variety of ways. Some are the
second stage to a removal case after the parent has rehabilitated
himself and has returned to the court that ordered the removal.
Others may result from the actions of a ,parent trying to undo a
voluntary private placement.1 87 Reunification cases also can in
volve parents who have never lacked the capability to care for their
children nor have they been "at fault" for the separation. A prime
example of this latter kind of case arises after a divorce, when a
custodial parent and child live with a third-party such as a steppar
ent or a grandparent. If the custodial parent dies or leaves the child
for any other reason, the noncustodial parent may be drawn into a
dispute with the third-party with whom the child has been living. 1ss
186. The court could always refer the family to DCF and can order the parent to
cooperate with the workers as Judge West did in Foster v. Devino, FA 94-0110479, 1994
Conn. Super. LEXIS 1161 at *2 (May 5, 1994). None of these actions are automatic,
however, and DCF is free to define its role with the family in accordance with its own
regulations, since the Commissioner is not a party to a guardianship or third-party case.
187. There may well be a correlation between a parent's socioeconomic status
and his tendency to use voluntary placements during a crisis. Professor Guggenheim
posits that children from poor and minority families are more apt to be seized by the
state if the parent has a problem, while a middle or upper class. parent wiII have the
family resources to assist them or the financial resources to hire help, so that the state
will never know about the family crisis. He suggests that once the state has intervened
in a family, the child is less likely to return home. Martin Guggenheim, The Political
and Legal Implications of the Psychological Parenting Theory. 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 549, 549-50 (1983-84). While there are undoubtedly many cases where
this is true, there also may be cases where the opposite is true. Although state interven
tion is carried out in an imperfect system. there are at least statutorily mandated safe
guards for the parent and an explicit policy in favor of family reunification. Unless
third-party custody cases are construed similarly, a voluntary placement arrangement
gone awry will give the parent fewer safeguards and, thus, less certainty that his child
will ever come home again.
188. The noncustodial parent does not have to be unfit or lacking as a parent to
lose custody to an ex-spouse. Nor does he have to consent to his child living with the
non-parent, who the custodial parent chose unilaterally.
Even a case where the parent and child have actually never lived together may
present a reunification case. In these cases, the term "reunification" may technically be
a misnomer, but the issues and the analysis are the same. If the child's parents never
lived together with the child, the noncustodial parent seeking custody from the non
parent may never have had anything more than a visiting parent relationship. This fact
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In a reunification case, the court should focus solely on the psy
chological impact that a change in custody will have on the child.
This approach allows a court to give priority to the goal of bringing
families back together while permitting it to identify those cases
where it is simply too late to reunite the family.189 Defining detri
ment this way in a reunification case furthers the objectives of the
Connecticut legislature, and achieves consistency with the guardian
ship and juvenile matters standards.
1.

Defining Detriment

In the context of a reunification case, the court's task is to de
cide whether it is appropriate to disrupt the bond between the child
should not automatically exclude the noncustodial parent from consideration, although
it will weaken the likelihood that the parent will prevail.
In some jurisdictions, a "rescinded adoption" case would fall within this sub-cate
gory. For example, the Michigan courts ultimately decided "Baby Jessica's" fate under
the Michigan third-party custody rules. In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993),
stays denied, 114 S. Ct. 1 (1993). In Connecticut, the supreme court decided a similar
rescinded adoption case, In re Baby Girl B., 618 A.2d 1 (Conn. 1992), pursuant to a
different standard in juvenile court and not as a third-party custody case. The Connect
icut decision upheld the trial court's decision to reopen a judgment terminating parental
rights and its finding that the state had not proven the grounds for termination. After
those determinations, the return of the child to her biological mother was automatic.
Commentators have criticized this practice, recommending instead that courts decide
with whom the child will live as a third-party custody case, separate from the termina
tion and adoption decision. See, e.g., Kirsten Korn, Comment, The Struggle for the
Child: Preserving the Family in Adoption Disputes Between Biological Parents and Third
Parties, 72 N.C.L. REv. 1279, 1330 (1994). While Connecticut has not expressly fol
lowed this approach, the legislature has adopted a new law that no longer allows a court
to return a child automatically if an adoption fails. 1993 Conn. Acts 170 (Reg. Sess.). If
the child's adoption is not yet final, the court is now required to reopen the termination
only if it is in the child's best interests. For the purpose of this Act only, the best
interests of the child include consideration of the following:
the age of the child, the nature of the relationship of the child with the care
taker of the child, the length of time the child has been in the custody of the
caretaker, the nature of the relationship of the child with the birth parent, the
length of time the child has been in the custody of the birth parent, any rela
tionship that may exist between the child and siblings or other children in the
caretaker's household, and the psychological and medical needs of the child.
The determination of the best interest of the child shall not be based on a
consideration of the socio-economic status of the birth parent or the caretaker.

Id.
189. It may be too late for the child to live with her parent no matter how
"blameless" the parent is. Consider the. case where the custodial parent has died and
the child is living with her stepparent. Even if the visiting parent has maintained a close
relationship with his child, the parent may nonetheless lose his bid for custody against
the stepparent if the child has half-siblings. While this result may seem unfair to the
parent, it is more important to consider how it affects the child. Moreover, the parent is
really no worse off than he was when his ex-spouse was still alive.
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and the non-pare~t. The legislature, by adopting this presumption,
has mandated that the court must start with the premise that the
child should return to the parent and has determined that the divid
ing line is substantial detriment to the child. The presumption
translates into an affirmative policy that a capable parent can be
reunited with his child under certain circumstances, even if the non
parent has taken superb care of the child. 1OO Therefore, the pre
sumption in favor of the parent requires the court to reject a com
parison approach, as it does in a removal case. The court is not to
select the better caretaker nor to decide the case on the simple basis
that the status quo is fine because the child is performing well
where she is.
Just as with removal cases, the task before the superior court in
a reunification case is not a unique one. Probate judges must de
cide when, if ever, to reinstate removed parents as guardians. 191 Ju
venile matters judges face a similar question when parents file
petitions to revoke the commitment of their children to the state192
or simply at the expiration of an eighteen month commitment.
Once again, it makes no sense to create a new test to use only in
third-party custody cases. The presumption in favor of the parent
is, quite simply, another way to state the policy in favor of reuniting
families and enhancing parental capacity.t93 It is appropriate, then,
to look to the probate court precedent and juvenile matters deci
sions for guidance in third-party custody reunification cases.
Both guardianship reinstatement and revocation of commit
ment cases require the court to determine as a first step whether the
original cause for the child's removal still exists.t 94 Resolving a
reunification custody case will also often require the court to en
gage in a two-step process.195 The court's threshold consideration
190. Indeed, this factor can have an ironic effect. The better the level of care has
been by the caretaker, the more likely that the child will have the emotional strength to
adjust to yet another move. See Waters and Noyes, supra note 165, at 512.
191. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-611 (1995).
192. § 46b-129(g).
193. § 17a-101(a).
194. § 46b-129(f) (1995); In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 420 A.2d 875, 887
(Conn. 1979); In re Guardianship of J., slip op. (Probate Dist. of Stratford, July 18, 1989
and Sept. 4, 1990) (Kurmay P.J.).
195. Especially when the court previously has removed the child from the par
ent's custody, the court will have to find first that the cause for the removal no longer
exists. But even in cases where the court never found the parent to be incapable of
caring for his child, the non-parent may raise the issue, as a matter of good-faith or just
as a tactical maneuver. Either way, it is inevitable that a court will first have to deter
mine whether or not the parent is capable of meeting the child's minimum needs.
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must be whether the parent is capable of having custody. Only a
capable parent is entitled to the benefit of the presumption of sec
tion 46b-56b. 196
Assuming the court finds the parent meets the minimum stan
dard of parental capability, the court must then wrestle with the
second and often tougher question in a reunification case: even
though the parent is fully capable of caring for his child, should the
child nonetheless remain living with the non-parent? The court
must compare the child's interest in reuniting her biological family
with her interest in preserving the family unit of which she is now a
part. 197 It is at this point that the child's needs are more likely to be
in conflict with those of her parent.
The only evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption in favor
of a capable parent is proof that the move itself will be substantially
detrimental to the child. The sole relevant factor is the degree of
psychological impact that the change in custody will have on the
child. Here the court is faced with trying to look into the future and
draw the line between an ordinary readjustment process and psy
chological harm of a long-term nature.
In a revocation of commitment case in Connecticut, it is the
state's burden to prove that "revocation would not be in the child's
best interests. "198 This is a high burden that the Connecticut
Supreme Court has expressed in terms of whether the shift of cus
tody back to the parent would be "detrimental" to the child,199 The
court has determined that for revocation cases, the trial courts must
assess the following factors: (1) the length of the child's stay in fos
ter care; (2) the nature of the child's relationship with the foster
parents; (3) the degree of contact maintained with the natural par
ent; and (4) the nature of the child's relationship to the natural par
ent,2oo These factors are wholly applicable to reunification cases.201
196. This inquiry is the same analysis of -the parent's present capabilities as that
required by the removal cases.
197. With respect to reunification cases, the psychological parent theory and the
attachment theory are in less agreement than on the removal issue. Under Goldstein,
Freud, and Solnit's theory, once the child is removed and forms a new bond, the courts
should safeguard that relationship just as jealously as the original parent-child bond .
. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 20 at 53. In contrast, attachment theory supports a view
that family ties are usually enduring so that children often can go home again without
severe upset. See Waters & Noyes, supra note 165, at 512-13.
198. In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 420 A.2d at 882.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 882-83. In this case, the parent had been in a mental hospital in Maine
and had very limited contact with her child. The Connecticut Supreme Court upheld
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In essence, they focus the court's attention on the question of how
difficult it will be for the child to move back to the parent's
home. 202
Unlike a removal case, this prong of a reunification case does
require a "sliding scale" analysis: the closer the bond between the
parent and the child, the less likely a court will find that a move will
cause the child substantial harm. The corollary is also true. The
closer the bond between the non-parent and the child, the more
likely it will be that the court will find that a move will cause emo
tional trauma to the child.
The "impact on the child" approach incorporates the guidance
that Justice Parskey offered in the McGaffin dissent203 and is con
sistent with the court's statement in Perez .204 Both opinions en
dorsed the concept that it takes something more than normal
adjustment difficulties to rebut the presumption in favor of a par
ent. It is also quite close to the one Judge Teller used in the case of
In re Jacqueline D.205 when he considered how long the child had
been separated from her father, how fully engaged she was in her
life with her grandparents, and how unlikely it was that the father
would be capable of assisting his daughter's readjustment. 206
The distinction between "normal" adjustment difficulties and
long-term harm is one that some of the other trial judges in Con
necticut have failed to make. In Busa v. Busa 207 and Sherman v.
Sherman,208 for example, the judges recognized that the effect of
the move was a relevant factor, but undercut the presumption by
assuming any move was sufficiently difficult on the child to justify
leaving the child with the non-parent. 209 The judges identified the
the trial court's denial of the petition to revoke commitment but ordered DCYS to
make active efforts to strengthen the parent's relationship with her child.
201. Indeed, the Connecticut Supreme Court even called its rule for revocation of
commitment cases a "presumption" in favor of allowing the child to return home and
cited as its authority a leading third-party custody case from New York,In re Bennett v.
Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277 (N.Y. 1976).
202. These factors are very similar to those enunciated in a new Connecticut law
that established the standard for courts to consider when asked to reopen or set aside a
termination of parental rights judgment. See 1993 Conn. Acts 170 (Reg. Sess.).
203. McGaffin v. Roberts, 479 A.2d 176, 186 (Conn. 1984), ceTt. denied, 470 U.S.
1050 (1985).
204. Perez v. Perez, 561 A.2d 907, 915 (Conn. 1989).
205. No. 87-128, 1992 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 1037 (Apr. 15, 1992).
206. Id. Although he did not use these precise words, the judge clearly believed
that Jacqueline would suffer long-term emotional harm if her father had custody. Id.
207. FA 82-0112775, 1991 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 1351 (June 7, 1991).
208. FA 90-02692085, 1992 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 2353 (July 29, 1992).
209. There is one unreported reunification case in Connecticut where the judge
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correct factor but set too low a threshold for it properly to consti
tute detriment. 210
2.

Burden and Level of Proof

In guardianship and juvenile matters cases, the burden of proof
is on the parent to prove his rehabilitation. 211 It makes sense to
adopt this rule from those analogous cases for reunification cases
that are the second stage of a case where a court has previously
removed the child. The parent who had lost custody by court order
in a third-party custody removal case must demonstrate his new pa
rental capability by a preponderance of the evidence when seeking
to restore custodial rights.
For reunification cases that are fresh judicial determinations of
custody between the parent and the non-parent,212 there is no basis
appears to have correctly applied the impact factor. In Yeargan v. Merrick, FA 90
0271030, Judicial District of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Nov. 27, 1990 (Hauser, J.), the
judge returned two young sons to their mother, who had previously placed her sons
with distant family members after a difficult separation from her abusive husband and
the sudden death of her father. At the time of the court's decision, the boys had been
in Pennsylvania for almost two years, having had only sporadic contact with their
mother. The non-parents had taught the children to caIl them "Mom and Dad" and had
changed the boys' first and last names. After the court determined that the mother was
a fit parent, the court ordered the return of the boys, even though they surely faced a
chaIlenging adjustment period. To assist them, the court had already increased visita
tion, and, in his final order, he also ordered the mother to continue in counseling for at
least two years and to include her sons in the therapy.
210. There is Significant caselaw in other jurisdictions supporting the "impact on
the child" definition of detriment in reunification cases. The Supreme Court of Colo
rado held that the presumption in favor of the parent is rebutted if removing a child
from a non-parent and awarding custody to the parent "would be extremely detrimental
to the child and would likely result in permanent damage to her personality and devel
opment." Root v. AIlen, 377 P.2d 117, 121 (Colo. 1962). Similarly, Virginia measures
whether returning custody to a parent would have a "significant harmful long term
impact" on the child. Bailes v. Sours, 340 S.E.2d 824, 827 (Va. 1986). In Florida, as in
Connecticut, a court may award custody to a non-parent if awarding custody to a parent
would cause detriment to the child. In re Guardianship of D.A. McW, 460 So. 2d 368,
370 (Fla. 1984). The Florida courts have defined detriment as:
circumstances that produce or are likely to produce lasting mental physical or
emotional harm .... [It is] more than the normal trauma caused to a child by
uprooting him from familiar surroundings such as often occurs by reason of
divorce, death of a parent or adoption. It contemplates a longer term adverse
effect that transcends the normal adjustment period in such cases.
In re Marriage of Matzen, 600 So. 2d 487, 490, (Fla. Dist. Q. App. 1992).
In Minnesota, proof that an emotionaIly-delayed child would suffer "severe emo
tional and behavioral regression" if she were moved again was sufficient to overcome
the presumption. Durkin v. Hinich, 442 N.W.2d 148, 153 (Minn. 1989).
211. In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 420 A.2d 875, 881 (Conn. 1979).
212. A reunification scenario where there has been no prior court-ordered re
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to place the burden of proof on the parent. 213 If the non-parent
raises the issue of the parent's fitness, he or she should have the
burden of proving the parent's incapacity, preferably by clear and
convincing evidence,214 exactly as he or she would be required to do
in a removal case. 2IS
Once the parent's capability is established, the court must de
termine the degree and type of impact that a move would have on
the child. It should be the non-parent's burden2I6 to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the move will cause a serious
impact on the child. This allocation of the burden makes the ap
proach consistent with the cases in the probate courts and juvenile
matters division.

moval cannot occur in an abuse and neglect case. It is also highly unlikely to occur in a
guardianship case. If a parent voluntarily leaves his child with a family member or
friend, that non-parent mayor may not act to make the arrangement official by going to
probate court for a guardianship order with the parent's consent. If the non-parent had
gone to probate court to be appointed as the child's guardian, then the later dispute
over the return of the child would not be the initial court action. If the non-parent had
never made the custody arrangement official, then the parent would file a habeas
corpus case in superior court to get his child back. The parent would not file in probate
court for reinstatement of his guardianship rights because, technically, he never lost
them.
213. This would be true even for cases where the parent placed his child volunta
rily with the non-parent. The rationale for "preferring" this parent by not requiring him
to prove his capability is to reward him for recognizing his own limitations and choosing
to safeguard his child's needs.
214. See supra notes 182-186 and accompanying text.
215. Once again, any clear and convincing standard would require legislative
amendment to the third-party custody statute. For the first prong of a reunification
case, it is appropriate to require the non-parent to prove the same type of evidence by
the same quantum of evidence as in a removal case. Requiring the non-parent to prove
the parent's incapacity guarantees consistent standards for all initial judicial decisions
that relate to a parent's fitness to care for the child. It is possible that a parent, by
placing the child voluntarily, has drawn the line for acceptable parenting at a level that
is higher than where a court would have set the limit in a contested proceeding. The
parent should not be penalized for wanting to make sure the child received more than
he could provide.
216. Because of the Connecticut Supreme Court's decision in Perez v. Perez, 561
A.2d 907 (Conn. 1989), the burden of proof now may be on the parent in a reunification
case if he files the case as a modification rather than as a habeas corpus case. The
presumption, because it is a substantive policy statement, requires a method for decid
ing these cases more enduring than that adopted in Perez. Professor McCormick recog
nizes that, although courts usually assign the burden of persuasion to the party seeking
to change the current state of affairs, this is not always true if special policy considera
tions are relevant. STRONG, supra note 105, § 337 at 570-71.
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The presumption in favor of a parent requires a judge to con
sider more than just whom he or she will choose as the custodian.
The presumption states a policy in favor of family preservation that
also places a responsibility on the superior court judges to actively
protect the bonds between parent and child. Yet again, this policy
is no different than that which guides the probate judges and juve
nile matters judges.217
When Probate Judge Kurmay removed a mother as guard
ian,218 he retained jurisdiction over the matter, ordered liberal but
structured visitation, and ordered the parent and child to undergo
counseling, both individually and jointly. The court monitored the
case closely. Three years later, the mother achieved the necessary
level of capability that enabled the court to reinstate her guardian
ship rights. It was not too late to do so, in part because the judge
did everything in his power to protect the relationship between
mother and daughter.
It is this kind of approach that the superior court judges must
take in third-party custody cases. H removal is necessary, then the
court must clearly articulate its basis for finding the parent lacked
the capability to care for the child. The decision should state ex
actly what the parent must do in order to regain custody. The court
should also order the parties, including the child, to participate in
counseling whenever it is even arguably appropriate. 219 Finally, the
court should order the maximum amount of appropriate visitation
between parent and child, including overnight visits, so that the
child will maintain a sense of the parent's house as "home."22o
217. The Connecticut Supreme Court has recognized that the private parties
seeking guardianship of a child do not have the same affirmative obligation to provide
services to the parents that the state does in abuse and neglect commitment cases. In re
Jessica M., 586 A.2d 597, 602-03 (Conn. 1991). This truism, however, does not relieve
the judges from using the full breadth of their authority and range of remedies to assist
parents in enhancing their parental capacity for good child care.
218. In re Guardianship of J., Probate District of Stratford, (Kurmay, P.J.) (Sept.
4, 1990).
219. While the court is not in a position to transport forcibly people to their coun
seling sessions, it is still useful to issue counseling orders. If a parent does not follow
through with counseling, that failure may form the basis for the court's subsequent re
fusal to reunite the parent and child. The court can also adjudicate the custodial non
parent in contempt in an extreme case where the non-parent is obstructing the child's
counseling.
220. The court should recognize that a non-parent who wishes to retain custody
permanently has a vested interest in undermining the relationship between parent and
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Judge West took just this approach in Foster v. Devino. 221 He
wrote that he believed that the grandparents' custody should con
tinue for only so long as is absolutely necessary.222 The opinion lays
out a blueprint for the mother: if she follows it, the judge will most
likely be able to send her children back home; if not, the children
will remain with their grandparents until it is too late for them to go
back.
Judges deciding reunification cases should consider whether
ordering a structured period of transition would be an appropriate
step. If the sole consideration is the impact of the move on the
child, then the judge sometimes holds the key to the successful re
adjustment. Rather than denying custody to a parent because there
is a rupture in the parent-child relationship, the court should take
an active role in attempting to repair that bond. Especially where
the relationship has been weakened by distance or visitation dis
putes with the non-parent, a period of gradual transition may be
entirelyappropriate. 223 As the Connecticut Supreme Court said in
Perez, the court must give a parent a reasonable opportunity to nur
ture a poor relationship between parent and child. 224
CONCLUSION

This article identifies several goals that establish the frame
work for deciding how best to resolve third-party custody cases.22S
The first is that the standard must acknowledge the constitutionally
protected rights of families to stay together whenever feasible.
child and may very well sabotage the visitation. The court should be an active partici
pant in protecting the visitation by responding swiftly to motions for contempt and with
the liberal use of make-up visits and sanctions such as fines.
221. FA 94-0110479, 1994 Conn. Super. Q. LEXIS 1161 (May 5, 1994).
222. [d. at *20.
223. In In re Guardianship of A & B, 5 Conn. Probate L.J. 15 (1989), Stratford
Probate Judge Kurmay denied reinstatement of a mother's guardianship rights over her
children who had been living with their grandfather for seven years. The mother was in
prison and then .worked out of state and had maintained only limited contact with the
children. However, the court did order an increased visitation schedule, ordered the
mother to participate monthly in the children's therapy sessions, and scheduled a re
hearing in the near future to reexamine the nature of the children's relationship with
their mother. Similarly, in Lewis v. Taylor, 554 So. 2d 158 (La. Ct. App. 1989), the court
ordered a six month transition period to assure a smoother change for the children and
to undo the damage done by the non-parents' resistance to visitation.
224. Perez v. Perez, 561 A.2d 907, 916 (Conn. 1989).
225. These recommended definitions of detriment effectuate the legislative intent
by construing the current statute. The recommendations regarding the allocation of the
burden of proof would require action by the supreme court or the legislature, and those
changes addressing the necessary level of proof would require legislative change.
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Courts must decide when a child's interests diverge from those of
the parent and then must find a way to balance these conflicting
rights fairly. Second, courts must implement the legislatively man
dated policy when the standard is pronounced by statute, as it is in
Connecticut. Legislative intent is the touchstone for construction.
When the legislature does not articulate every aspect of its policy
exhaustively, then the courts must fill in any gaps in order to further
the task the legislature started, not frustrate it. Finally, when other
statutory schemes exist, and there is a significant similarity and
overlap in the cases that reach each of the courts, the courts must
strive towards consistency, looking beyond the quirks of jurisdiction
and the procedural posture of cases.
Achieving these goals requires the ini~ial recognition that, in a
parental presumption jurisdiction such as Connecticut, the court's
job in every third-party custody case is to consider whether there
will be substantial emotional or physical harm to the child if she
remains in or returns to the parent's custody. The court may not
define its task as a comparison of the two environments in the
search for the most benefits to the child or the better caretaker.
Since the type of harm and how to measure it varies considerably
with whether the case is a removal or a reunification case, the sec
ond step requires recognition that the definition of detriment and
method of rebuttal of the presumption -will also vary.
In a removal case, the court should only award custody to the
non-parent if he or she has proven that the parent is incapable of
meeting the child's basic, minimum needs. In determining the effi
cacy of removal, it is only "detrimental to the child" to be in the
care of a parent who cannot care for her adequately. If the judge
concludes that removal is necessary, the opinion should state clearly
the grounds for removal and should fashion visitation and counsel
ing orders that will foster an on-going, and hopefully improved, par
ent-child relationship.
When a parent seeks to be reunited with. the child, the court
must first distinguish between those cases where the removal was
by a prior court order based on a finding of parental incapability
and those where the separation was the result of some voluntary
action by the parent. This distinction dictates whether the parent
must first prove his capability by a preponderance of the evidence.
Assuming that the court finds that the parent meets the minimum
standard of parental capability, the sole remaining issue is an evalu
ation of the psychological impact that the move back to the parent
would have on the child. The non-parent has the burden of proving
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by a preponderance of the evidence that the change in custody
would have a negative effect on the child of a magnitude in excess
of usual adjustment difficulties. It is "detrimental to the child" to
be reunited with her parent only if the move would cause substan
tiallong-term psychological harm to the child.
Third-party custody cases require trial courts to decide pre
cisely when to separate parent and child and when to refuse to reu
nite them.· The judges are often barraged with information and
opinions from the competing custodians, the child, their counsel,
and expert witnesses. With only the ambiguous concept of detri
ment as guidance, it has proven to be a difficult task for the court to
find, amidst all that noise, the few truly relevant factors in a third
party custody case. This Article provides the policy and evidentiary
considerations and specific definitions for deciding these cases fairly
for the adults, while protecting the child caught in the middle.

